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82 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
INTRODUCTION
“[T]hat way madness lies,” or so said one eighteenth-century 
commentator exacerbated from summarizing the law of libel.1 And that
was before the United States Supreme Court, in 1964, began
constitutionalizing substantial parts of it in New York Times v. Sullivan, 
transforming personal injury lawyers into constitutional ones overnight. In 
that case, the Court declared that the First Amendment had a “central
meaning,” namely, protecting the public discussion necessary for effective
self-governance.2 Or in the words of James Madison, “In every state,
probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the
merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not
been confined to the strict limits of the common law.”3 “The choice of [the
Court’s] language was unusually apt,” Harry Kalven wrote.4 “The 
Amendment has a ‘central meaning’—a core of protection of speech
without which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison’s
phrase, ‘the censorial power’ would be in the Government over the people
and not ‘in the people over the government.’”5 
To give force to the central meaning, the Court determined that the
First Amendment protected even some false and defamatory speech. The
logic being that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and
that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”6 As such, in Sullivan, 
the Court adopted the actual-malice requirement, which required that a 
public-official defamation plaintiff plead and ultimately prove that the
defendant knew what she was publishing was false or had a high degree
of awareness that it probably was.7 While Sullivan only imposed the 
actual-malice requirement on public-official plaintiffs, the Court later
extended it to public figures as well, i.e., those who achieved “pervasive
1. William MacKay, Libel, 16 TIME 268, 273 (1887), https://catalog
.hathitrust.org/Record/000519851 [https://perma.cc/FM8X-J7QS].
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
3. Id. at 275 (citing 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT’S DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 570 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]).
4. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
5. Id.
6. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
7. Id. at 279–80.
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832021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
fame or notoriety” in the community or those who “voluntarily inject[]”
themselves or are “drawn into a particular public controversy.”8 
To defense lawyers, the actual-malice requirement is a formidable 
defense; to plaintiffs’ lawyers, it stands as a “daunting” obstacle.9 And for
years, the actual-malice standard “seemed settled.”10 But then in 2019,
Justice Clarence Thomas penned an opinion concurring in the denial of
certiorari in McKee v. Cosby to question the provenance of Sullivan’s 
actual-malice requirement.11 According to Thomas, the Court in
Sullivan—a unanimous Court no less—failed to make “a sustained effort
to ground [its] holding[] in the Constitution’s original meaning.”12 Instead, 
he characterized Sullivan “and the Court’s decisions extending it [as]
policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law.”13 These
rulings, he said, “broke sharply from the common law of libel, and there
are sound reasons to question whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments displaced this body of common law.”14 
Then in 2021, in Berisha v. Lawson, in response to a petition asking
the Court to overrule its precedents extending the actual-malice
requirement to public figures, Thomas and Justice Neil Gorsuch filed
opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari.15 In his dissent, Thomas
again maintained that “[t]his Court’s pronouncement that the First
Amendment requires public figures to establish actual malice bears ‘no
relation to the text, history, or structure of the Constitution.’”16 Gorsuch,
for the first time, expressed his agreement: “Departures from the
Constitution’s original public meaning are usually the product of good
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); see generally
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9. McFarlane v. Esquire Mag., 74 F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
10. Jaden Edison, Defamation was considered a well-settled area of law.
Then came social media., POYNTER (July 9, 2021), https://www.poynter.org/
reporting-editing/2021/defamation-was-considered-a-well-settled-area-of-law-then
-came-social-media [https://perma.cc/L55J-G6RP].
11. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
12. Id. at 678.
13. Id. at 676.
14. Id. at 678.
15. In Berisha v. Lawson, the author was counsel to Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
the publisher-defendant in the case. The views expressed in this Article are his
own.
16. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (citing Tah v. Glob. Witness Publ’g, Inc., 991 F.3d 231,
251 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
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84 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
intentions. But less clear is how well Sullivan and all its various extensions
serve its intended goals in today’s changed world.”17 
This Article is in defense of Sullivan, challenging Thomas’s and 
Gorsuch’s attacks on that case. First, Part I summarizes the justices’ main
complaints with Sullivan and the actual-malice rule. Turning to the
challenge, Part II raises questions about Thomas’s purported method for
understanding the meaning of the First Amendment at the Founding. Parts
III–VI then conduct a wide-ranging analysis of the historical record as it
concerns the interaction of freedom of the press and libel in the early
United States, drawing into doubt the central claim that the Founders
simply equated freedom of the press in America to freedom of the press in
England. This review demonstrates that far from freedom of the press 
forming against the backdrop of the common law of libel, as Thomas
suggests, the law of libel in the United States formed against the backdrop
of an American understanding of freedom of the press. Finally, Part VII
offers some responses to Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s more pragmatic attacks
on Sullivan.
I. THE PETITIONS
In the decades since the Court decided Sullivan, litigants rarely
questioned it. About 20 years ago, however, that began to change as
defamation plaintiffs filed petitions asking the Court to limit or overrule
the case. Time and again, the Court refused.18 So in 2019, when Thomas
called on the Court to take up one of these petitions, people took notice.19 
First Amendment lawyers Lee Levine and Stephen Wermiel said there was
no reason for alarm: “Justice Clarence Thomas’s broadside against New
York Times v. Sullivan would most likely not have fazed Justice William
17. Id. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
18. See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019); Horne v. WTVR, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 823 (2019); Cottrell v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 648 (2017); Knight v. Chi.
Trib. Co., 558 U.S. 817 (2009); Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 531 U.S. 1075
(2001).
19. David Schulz, INSIGHT: Justice Thomas Takes Troubling Turn on
Landmark Libel Decision, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 25, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-justice-thomas-takes-troubling-turn
-on-landmark-libel-decision [https://perma.cc/DHN7-BCF7]; Rod Smolla, Look to
Bill Cosby case as proof that American defamation law needs a review, DEL.
ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2019, 10:04 AM), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/
opinion/2019/03/12/bill-cosby-case-proof-american-defamation-law-needs-review
/3138481002 [https://perma.cc/4VQX-JD57].
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852021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
J. Brennan Jr., the author of that landmark decision.”20 Thomas relied “on
arguments made and rejected decades earlier,” and “Brennan would likely
say he had heard it all before, both from the unsuccessful plaintiff in
Sullivan itself and from his successors in the roughly 30 cases decided by
the Supreme Court that collectively constitute Sullivan’s progeny.”21 
Still, there was the question of whether Thomas was right that Sullivan
cannot be supported under an originalist understanding of the First
Amendment. On this, scholars disagreed. Cass Sunstein argued that in
devising the Sullivan rule, “the Court did not really speak in originalist
terms.”22 On the other hand, Josh Blackman asserted that the
“constitutional objections to the Sedition Act of 1798 provide some
originalist basis to impose a higher bar for libel suits filed by government
officials.”23 Marty Lederman also questioned Thomas’s thesis, calling it
not “terribly compelling.”24 To begin to assess the bona fides of these
competing claims, we have to look to Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s opinions
themselves.
A. McKee v. Cosby
Kathrine McKee alleged that she was one of Bill Cosby’s numerous
victims of sexual violence.25 In response to one of McKee’s interviews,
Marty Singer, Cosby’s lawyer, sent a letter to the news organization 
“attack[ing] McKee with numerous false allegations, calling her an
admitted liar, not credible, unchaste, and a criminal.”26 As a result, McKee
filed a defamation lawsuit.27 The district court dismissed that lawsuit on a
number of grounds, and the First Circuit affirmed, finding that McKee was 
20. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, What Would Justice Brennan Say to
Justice Thomas?, 34 COMMC’NS LAW. 1 (2019) (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
22. Cass R. Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment 14 n.73 (July 25,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3426765
[https://perma.cc/4NH5-7CMS]).
23. Josh Blackman, Originalism and Stare Decisis in the Lower Courts, 13 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 44, 54–55 (2019).
24. Marty Lederman, Justice Thomas’s Attack on New York Times v. Sullivan: 
Old Originalism in New Originalist Garb, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 23, 2019),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/02/justice-thomas-and-nyt-v-sullivan-old.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9MU-7RF3].
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675
(2018) (No. 17-1542).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 6.
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86 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
a limited-purpose public figure who failed to adequately plead actual
malice.28 
McKee filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in April 2018. The
petition presented a single question: “Whether a victim of sexual
misconduct who merely publicly states that she was victimized . . . has
thrust herself to the forefront of a public debate . . . thereby becoming a
limited purpose public figure who loses her right to recover for defamation
absent a showing of actual malice.”29 The petition did not otherwise
challenge the validity of the actual-malice requirement or ask the Court to 
reconsider it. Instead, it claimed that there was a split on a more picayune
question: what was needed to show that a private figure had become a
public figure.30 
Cosby waived the right to respond to the petition, but the Court
requested one.31 Cosby then argued that the petition should be denied 
because, among other things, no circuit split existed.32 After receiving 
McKee’s reply brief, the case was set to be distributed for the justices’
conference to be held on September 24, 2018.33 But the petition’s
consideration was rescheduled 12 times.34 At the time, the reason for the
rescheduling was a mystery, but Thomas’s opinion concurring in the
denial would reveal that it was Justice Thomas, in chambers, with the pen.
For six months, Thomas was researching and writing his opinion
concurring in the denial of the petition.35 
In that opinion, Thomas agreed with the Court’s decision to deny
certiorari rather than wade into the “factbound question” of whether
McKee was a limited-purpose public figure.36 Thomas wrote for himself,
however, to explain “why, in an appropriate case, [the Court] should
reconsider the precedents that require courts to ask it in the first place.”37 
The headline was a bold one: Sullivan “and the Court’s decisions
extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional
law,” and they should be “reconsider[ed].”38 According to Thomas, the 
28. Id.
29. Id. at i.
30. Id. at 7–9.
31. Waiver, McKee, 139 S. Ct. 675 (No. 17-1542).
32. Brief of Respondent William H. Cosby, Jr., McKee, 139 S. Ct. 675 (No.
17-1542).
33. Docket, McKee, 139 S. Ct. 675 (No. 17-1542).
34. Id.
35. See generally McKee, 139 S. Ct. 675.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 676.
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872021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Court “did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175 years
after the First Amendment was ratified,” and it should leave it to the States 
to “strik[e] an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public
discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm.”39 
Thomas’s ultimate thesis was this: “The constitutional libel rules
adopted by this Court in [Sullivan] and its progeny broke sharply from the
common law of libel, and there are sound reasons to question whether the
First and Fourteenth Amendments displaced this body of common law.”40 
He supported this theory in four parts, focusing on (1) the common law of
libel’s treatment of public officials, (2) the Court’s pre-Sullivan treatment
of libel law, (3) the historical support for the proposition that either state
or federal constitutions were intended to displace the common law of libel,
and, finally, (4) Sullivan’s alleged failure to point to any historical
evidence supporting the establishment of the actual-malice rule except
“opposition surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798.”41 His factual support
for each point came in three kinds: two nineteenth-century treatises and 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England; pre-Sullivan 
Supreme Court jurisprudence; and a handful of nineteenth-century state-
court libel decisions.42 
39. Id. at 682.
40. Id. at 678.
41. Id. at 681.
42. The entirety of materials Thomas provides in support of his arguments
(in order of appearance) are: HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, FOLKARD’S STARKIE 
ON SLANDER AND LIBEL (H.G. Wood ed., 4th ed. 1877); 1 BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS,
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch &
Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE]; MARTIN L. NEWELL,
DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES AS 
ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1890); 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808); White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 266 (1845); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007); Dexter v. Spear, 7 F. Cas. 624 (C.C.R.I. 1825) (No.
3,867); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); George
Chase, Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office, 23 AM. L. REV.
346 (1889); Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Hamilton v. Eno, 81
N.Y. 116 (1880); Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); Royce v.
Maloney, 5 A. 395 (Vt. 1886); Wheaton v. Beecher, 33 N.W. 503 (Mich. 1887);
Prosser v. Callis, 19 N.E. 735 (Ind.1889); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337
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88 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
First, Thomas argued that neither in 1791, when the States ratified the
First Amendment, nor in 1868, when they ratified the Fourteenth, did
“[t]he common law of libel . . . require public figures to satisfy any kind
of heightened liability standard as a condition of recovering damages.”43 
A plaintiff in a civil defamation case typically, Thomas wrote, “needed
only to prove ‘a false written publication that subjected him to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule.’”44 Malice and injury were presumed, and truth was
a defense.45 As to criminal libel at common law, Thomas noted that “truth
traditionally was not a defense to libel prosecutions—the crime was
intended to punish provocations to a breach of the peace, not the falsity of
the statement.”46 These laws, he said, were widespread at the Founding— 
the implication being that no one understood them to be unconstitutional
in 1791. Still, Thomas admitted that both civil and criminal libel law
developed throughout the nineteenth century, before the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.47 
Moreover, Thomas said, “Far from increasing a public figure’s burden
in a defamation action, the common law deemed libels against public
figures to be, if anything, more serious and injurious than ordinary
libels.”48 He supported this assertion by reference to Blackstone and an
early treatise that explained, “Libel of a public official was deemed an
offense ‘most dangerous to the people, and deserv[ing of] punishment,
because the people may be deceived and reject the best citizens to their
great injury, and it may be to the loss of their liberties.’”49 He also offered 
as support the medieval English statutes of scandalum magnatum that
found words “in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of the
realm” to be “more heinous” than other libels.50 
Second, Thomas argued that the “‘core private righ[t]’ of a person’s
‘uninterrupted enjoyment of . . . his reputation formed the backdrop
against which the First and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified’” and
was never viewed by the Court as colliding with these Amendments.51 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825);
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 3.
43. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 678.
44. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 765 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 678 (citing 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *150–51).
47. Id. (citing Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254–55).
48. Id. at 679 (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. (citing NEWELL, supra note 42, at 533).
50. Id. at n.2 (citing 3 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *123).
51. Id. at 679.
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892021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Before Sullivan, he said, the Supreme Court in cases like Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire and Near v. Minnesota “consistently recognized that the
First Amendment did not displace the common law of libel.”52 Instead, the
Court recognized that libel, like obscenity, was one of the “well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem.”53 Yet the Sullivan Court refused to 
repudiate these earlier cases on its way to the holding in that case, choosing
instead to merely reject the “generality of this historic view.”54 
Third, Thomas wrote that there “are sound reasons to question whether
either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood,
encompasse[d] an actual-malice standard for public figures or otherwise
displace[d] vast swaths of state defamation law.”55 There was “[s]cant, if
any, evidence . . . that the First Amendment was intended to abolish the
common law of libel, at least to the extent of depriving ordinary citizens
of meaningful redress against their defamers.”56 Rather, “protections for
free speech and a free press” were understood “not [to] abrogate the
common law of libel.”57 In support, he offered seven nineteenth-century 
cases and asserted that “[p]ublic officers and public figures continued to
be able to bring civil libel suits for unprivileged statements without
showing proof of actual malice.”58 He further pointed to states that
continued to criminalize libel against public officials, citing the Court’s 
1952 decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois and three state courts’ opinions.59 
Moreover, multiple Reconstruction Congresses “approved Constitutions
of ‘Reconstructed’ States that expressly mentioned state libel laws, and
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
54. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 386 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting)).
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 381 (White, J., dissenting)).
57. Id. at 681 (citing Chase, supra note 42).
58. Id. (first citing Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); then
citing White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 291 (1845); then citing Hamilton
v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116, 126 (1880); then citing Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1809); then citing Royce v. Maloney, 5 A. 395 (Vt. 1886); then citing Wheaton
v. Beecher, 33 N.W. 503 (Mich. 1887); and then citing Prosser v. Callis, 19 N.E.
735 (Ind. 1889)).
59. Id. (first citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1952); then
citing People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 377–78, 393–94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1804); then citing Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 179–70 (1808); and then 
citing Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 311–14 (1825)).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  94 11/19/21  12:00 PM




   
 
   
 
  
   
  
   
    
 
   
  
   
 
   
   
  
     
 
   
   
   
  
 
   
   
 
     
     
  
    
      
    
      
   
    
     
     
      
   
90 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
also approved similar Constitutions for States erected out of the federal
domain.”60 
Finally, Thomas turned to Sullivan itself, faulting the Court for too
brief a historical survey. Sullivan, he said, “pointed only to opposition 
surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited ‘any false,
scandalous and malicious writing’ against ‘the government of the United
States.’”61 This history was not persuasive, because “constitutional
opposition to the Sedition Act—a federal law directly criminalizing
criticism of the Government—d[id] not necessarily support a
constitutional actual-malice rule in all civil libel actions brought by public
figures.”62 And Madison, rather than eschew the common law in his fight 
against the Sedition Act, “seemed to contemplate that ‘those who
administer [the Federal Government]’ retain ‘a remedy, for their injured
reputations, under the same laws, and in the same tribunals.’”63 In sum,
Thomas said, “[T]here appear[ed] to be little historical evidence 
suggesting that the [Sullivan] actual-malice rule flows from the original
understanding of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.”64 
Thomas conceded, nevertheless, “that defamation law did not remain
static after the founding.”65 He acknowledged that the “common law did
afford defendants a privilege to comment on public questions and matters
of public interest.”66 The privilege, he said, allowed discussion about the
“public conduct of a public man,” which was seen as “a ‘matter of public
interest’ that could ‘be discussed with the fullest freedom.’”67 The
privilege was nevertheless limited by its purpose: it did not extend to an
official’s private conduct and “applied only when the facts stated were
true.”68 On the criminal side, state courts in the nineteenth century began
“allow[ing] truth or good motives to serve as a defense to a libel
60. Id. (citing Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 293–94).
61. Id. (citing Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–77 (1964)).
62. Id. at 682.
63. Id. (citing ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 3, at 573). “Seemed to
contemplate” here is doing a lot of heavy lifting, as the portion quoted by Thomas
was from a question Madison was posing, not a declarative statement.
64. Id. 
65. Id.
66. Id. at 679 (citing FOLKARD, supra note 42, at 237–38).
67. Id. (citing FOLKARD, supra note 42, at 242).
68. Id. (citing FOLKARD, supra note 42, at 238 n.4); White v. Nicholls, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 266, 290 (1845)).
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912021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
prosecution.”69 Eventually, criminal libel virtually disappeared.70 Yet
these changes were not the product of constitutional law but changing
policy judgments.71 
If the hope had been to get other justices to sign on, it would soon be
dashed. Thomas wrote for himself alone. And while there was a general
fear that the new crop of conservative judges appointed by Donald Trump
would be hostile to the press, the most recent appointees to the Supreme
Court, Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, had enthusiastically
endorsed Sullivan in opinions as circuit judges.72 Other conservatives on
the Court appeared equally unlikely to support Thomas’s vision. Justice
Samuel Alito had previously endorsed the Court’s jurisprudence: “The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression serves many purposes,
but its most important role is protection of robust and uninhibited debate
on important political and social issues.”73 “If citizens cannot speak freely
and without fear about the most important issues of the day,” Alito wrote,
“real self-government is not possible.”74 
If Thomas was going to find any sympathizers, Justice Elena Kagan
was his best bet. Decades earlier, Kagan wrote in a law review article that
“the revolution worked by Sullivan in the treatment of public official libel
suits appears justified, correct, even obvious.”75 But, she added, Sullivan
“impose[d] serious costs,” the “adverse consequences” of which “do not
prove Sullivan itself wrong, but . . . force consideration of the question
whether the Court, in subsequent decisions, has extended the Sullivan
principle too far.”76 Later, during her confirmation hearing, Kagan also
asserted, consistent with Thomas, that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution
69. Id. at 678 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–55 n.4
(1952)).
70. Id. at 682 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 69 (1964)).
71. Id. at 681.
72. Special Report on Supreme Court Nominee Brett M. Kavanaugh, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (July 12, 2018), https://
www.rcfp.org/kavanaugh/ [https://perma.cc/BEJ4-RDMU]; Special Report on
Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gorsuch, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.rcfp.org/gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/G25V-
3EA4].
73. Nat’l Rev., Inc. v. Mann, 140 S. Ct. 344, 346 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
74. Id.
75. Elena Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now (reviewing Anthony
Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991)), 18 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 197, 204 (1993).
76. Id. at 204–05.
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92 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
did not understand the First Amendment as extending to libelous
speech.”77 But Kagan did not sign on to Thomas’s dissent either.
B. Berisha v. Lawson
In Berisha v. Lawson, Shkëlzen Berisha, the son of former Albanian
Prime Minister Sali Berisha, sued the publisher Simon & Schuster and its
author, Guy Lawson, for defamation arising out of the book Arms and the
Dudes, which was later turned into the movie War Dogs.78 Berisha argued
that the book defamed him insofar as it alleged that Berisha was part of
the Albanian mafia and involved in a “tragic explosion of an Albanian
munitions stockpile” that “killed 26 people.”79 The district court granted 
summary judgment on the grounds that Berisha was a public figure who
lacked sufficient evidence demonstrating that defendants acted with actual
malice.80 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed.81 
In February 2021, Berisha filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,
which, unlike the McKee petition, posed the question directly: “The 
question presented is whether this Court should overrule the ‘actual
malice’ requirement it imposed on public figure defamation plaintiffs.”82 
As in McKee, the defendants waived their right to respond to the petition,
but the Court requested one.83 And, as in McKee, once the Court received
the response, the case was relisted multiple times. Then, on the last day of
the term, in the last order list of the term, the Court denied the petition.84 
This time, Thomas dissented, as did Gorsuch.
Citing his decision in McKee, Thomas began: “Berisha . . . asks this
Court to reconsider the ‘actual malice’ requirement as it applies to public
figures. As I explained recently, we should.”85 Thomas explained again
that “[t]his Court’s pronouncement that the First Amendment requires 
public figures to establish actual malice bears ‘no relation to the text,
77. Questions for the Record by Senator John Cornyn with Elena Kagan,
Nominee, Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Written_Cornyn.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5Y-HEP7].
78. Berisha v. Lawson, 973 F.3d 1304, 1306–09 (11th Cir. 2020).
79. Id. at 1308.
80. Berisha v. Lawson, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1159–61 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
81. Berisha, 973 F.3d at 1321.
82. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424
(2021) (No. 20-1063).
83. Waiver, Berisha, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (No. 20-1063).
84. Order, Berisha, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (No. 20-1063).
85. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2424 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  97 11/19/21  12:00 PM





      
    
   
  
   
  











    
   
  
     
   
   
   
  
     
  
 
     
 
   
   
   
   
    
    
   
      
     
   
932021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
history, or structure of the Constitution.’”86 “In fact,” he wrote, “the 
opposite rule historically prevailed . . . .”87 And the “Court provided scant
explanation for the decision to erect a new hurdle for public-figure
plaintiffs so long after the First Amendment’s ratification.”88 He also
questioned why becoming a public figure, i.e., exposing oneself to
increased risk of injury by defamatory falsehood, should “mean[]
forfeiting the remedies legislatures put in place for such [defamation]
victims.”89 After cataloguing all the real-world effects of the rule, he
concluded, “The proliferation of falsehoods is, and always has been, a
serious matter. Instead of continuing to insulate those who perpetrate lies
from traditional remedies like libel suits, we should give them only the
protection the First Amendment requires.”90 
Gorsuch, too, claimed that the dearth of historical support for Sullivan
merited granting the petition. According to him, “To govern themselves
wisely, the framers knew, people must be able to speak and write, question
old assumptions, and offer new insights.”91 But with this right came a duty:
“[T]hose exercising the freedom of the press had a responsibility to try to
get the facts right—or, like anyone else, answer in tort for the injuries they
caused.”92 “This principle,” he said, “extended far back in the common
law and far forward into our Nation’s history.”93 Citing Blackstone,
Gorsuch argued that “‘[e]very freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public,’ but if he publishes falsehoods ‘he
must take the consequence of his own temerity.’”94 
Gorsuch also observed that in the nineteenth century, Justice Joseph
Story maintained that “the liberty of the press do[es] not authorize
malicious and injurious defamation.”95 It was this view, he said, that was
accepted in “this Nation for more than two centuries.”96 Thus, from the
Founding to 1964 when the Court decided Sullivan, defamation law was






91. Id. at 2425–26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
92. Id. at 2426.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *151–52).
95. Id. (quoting Dexter v. Spear, 7 F. Cas. 624 (C.C.R.I. 1825) (No. 3,867)).
96. Id.
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94 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
“almost exclusively the business of state courts and legislatures.”97 Before
Sullivan, “all persons could recover damages for injuries caused by false
publications about them.”98 
He spent the rest of his opinion cataloguing how different the world in
2021 was from that of 1964. In 1964, “building printing presses and
amassing newspaper distribution networks demanded significant
investment and expertise,” and broadcasting television “required licenses
for limited airwaves and access to highly specialized equipment.”99 As a 
result, a few “large companies dominated the press, often employing
legions of investigative reporters, editors, and fact-checkers.”100 But 
“today virtually anyone in this country can publish virtually anything for
immediate consumption virtually anywhere in the world.”101 These
changes had the knock-on effect of decimating responsible publishers’
newsrooms and replacing them with “24-hour cable news and online
media platforms that ‘monetize anything that garners clicks’” and do more
to deceive than inform.102 
It was “hard not to wonder what these changes mean for the law,”
Gorsuch said.103 In other words, “it’s less obvious what force [the actual-
malice rule] has in a world in which everyone carries a soapbox in their
hands,” as opposed to one with “comparatively few platforms for
speech.”104 And Gorsuch argued that in 1964, unlike today, the Court “may
have thought the actual malice standard justified in part because other
safeguards existed to deter the dissemination of defamatory falsehoods
and misinformation.”105 But now, “in a new era where the old economic
model that supported reporters, fact-checking, and editorial oversight is
disappearing,” he questioned whether either assumption remained true.106 
These changes raised still more fundamental questions.107 Gorusch 
argued that in Sullivan, the Court accepted that the actual-malice rule 
97. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369–70 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting)).
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 2427 (citing David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by







105. Id. (citing Logan, supra note 99, at 794–95).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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952021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
would shield “some false information,” but in practice the actual-malice 
rule has turned into something of a grant of “immunity from liability.”108 
Indeed, in 2017 there were only three libel trials, while there had been
nearly 30 in the 1980s.109 Worse still, of those plaintiffs who do secure a
jury verdict, “nearly one out of five today will have their awards
eliminated in post-trial motions practice.”110 The actual-malice rule has
also been applied to an ever-growing class of plaintiffs—not just
prominent government officials: “In 1964, the Court may have thought the
actual-malice standard would apply only to a small number of prominent
governmental officials,” but today it applies to the vast majority of public
officials and public figures.111 With the internet, “private citizens can
become ‘public figures’ on social media overnight.”112 Thus, random
people “can be deemed ‘famous’ because of their notoriety in certain
channels of our now-highly segmented media even as they remain
unknown in most.”113 
This led to Gorsuch’s “bottom line”: “It seems that publishing without
investigation, fact-checking, or editing has become the optimal legal
strategy.”114 “[I]gnorance is bliss.”115 When the actual-malice rule is
combined “with the business incentives fostered by our new media world,”
“the deck seems stacked against those with traditional (and expensive)
journalistic standards—and in favor of those who can disseminate the most
sensational information as efficiently as possible without any particular
concern for truth.”116 “Rules intended to ensure a robust debate over
actions taken by high public officials carrying out the public’s business,”
Gorsuch said, “increasingly seem to leave even ordinary Americans
without recourse for grievous defamation.”117 In light of all of this,
invoking the law review article published by Kagan, he wrote, “[I]t’s hard
not to ask whether it now even ‘cut[s] against the very values underlying
the decision.’”118 
In short, “it’s far from obvious whether Sullivan’s rules do more to





112. Id. at 2429.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Logan, supra, note 99, at 778–79).
115. Id. (citing Logan, supra, note 99, at 778).
116. Id. at 2428.
117. Id. at 2429 (citing Logan, supra, note 99, at 778).
118. Id. at 2428 (quoting Kagan, supra note 75, at 207).
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96 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
discourage them from risking even the slightest step toward public life.”119 
So he added his voice to the “[m]any Members of this Court [who] have 
raised questions about various aspects of Sullivan”—although, unlike
Thomas, he did “not profess any sure answers” and was “not even certain
of all the questions we should be asking.”120 While he did not doubt the
Court had good intentions—“[d]epartures from the Constitution’s original
public meaning are usually the product of good intentions”—he urged that
the Court “return[] its attention, whether in this case or another, to a field
so vital to the ‘safe deposit’ of our liberties.”121 
II. WHAT HISTORY COUNTS?
Having reviewed Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s attacks, we can turn to the
real endeavor here: determining whether they are right about the historical
record. Thomas’s thesis in McKee, with which Gorsuch seemed to agree 
in Berisha, is simple: “The constitutional libel rules adopted by this Court
in [Sullivan] and its progeny broke sharply from the common law of libel,
and there are sound reasons to question whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments displaced this body of common law.”122 This Article’s
counter-thesis is also simple: since 1791, the development of the common
law of libel in early America alongside that of the freedom of the press
demonstrates that Sullivan and its progeny were far from an aberration. 
As we have competing theses, a note on the burden here seems
appropriate. Thomas and Gorsuch have, to borrow some debate
terminology, made the motion that Sullivan should be overruled because
it lacks originalist support. This Article, however, is not meant to establish
the converse of the motion, that is, that the actual-malice rule follows
invariably from an originalist’s analysis of the First Amendment. Nor
could it: not all of Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s historical authority can be
swept away. This Article freely admits as much.
What this Article is meant to establish is reasonable doubt as to
Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s claim.123 It does so by marshalling historical
evidence drawing into doubt the absolutist conclusions they make. And
that is the point. Thomas and Gorsuch present the history of the common
119. Id. at 2429.
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 2430.
122. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 678 (2019).
123. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954) (“[O]ur own
investigation convince[s] us that, although these [historical] sources cast some
light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best,
they are inconclusive.”).
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972021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
law of libel as if it were a tidy corner of the law where nothing is out of
place. They do the same of the understanding of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments before Sullivan. But libel in the United States is not now, nor
ever was, tidy. And the history of the First Amendment, let alone the 
Fourteenth, is not a monolith. The founding generation and the Congresses
of the Reconstruction were not of one mind when it came to the common
law of libel or the effect, if any, the First and Fourteenth Amendments had
on it. In short, this Article brings into high relief the historical wrinkles
that Thomas tried to flatten out or that Gorsuch simply ignored to make
their arguments more attractive.
For the same reason, this Article does not really quibble with
originalism.124 It suffices to note now some of the problems with the
approach. First, there is the issue of how much history one needs to
conclude that he or she has arrived at an originalist understanding.
Thomas, for example, has relied on varying amounts of historical evidence
to satisfy himself that history is on his side. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, he cataloged the historical record at length but characterized 
it as “not as complete or as full as I would desire” yet good enough to
conclude that the Founders intended the First Amendment to protect
anonymous speech.125 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, he rested on 
just three post-Reconstruction cases.126 In Morse v. Frederick, he satisfied
himself based on a smattering of cases from the 19th and early 20th
centuries.127 Later, in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., Thomas relied
principally on a single pre-Reconstruction case, which earned the response
from Alito and Gorsuch that a single case provided “no basis for
concluding that the original public meaning of the free-speech right
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments was understood by
Congress or the legislatures that ratified those Amendments as permitting
a public school to punish a wide swath of off-premises student speech.”128 
Second, there is the issue of what is to be done with historical evidence
that cuts in opposite directions. McIntyre highlights this problem. There,
Thomas pointed out that early legislatures attempted to unmask the
124. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J.
239, 244 (2009).
125. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 367 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
126. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
127. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413–15 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
128. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 n.14 (2021)
(Alito, J., concurring).
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98 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
identities of various authors.129 In one vignette, he explained that during a 
sitting of the Continental Congress, Elbridge Gerry “moved to haul the
printer of the newspaper before Congress to answer questions concerning
Leonidas[’s] [identity].”130 The motion was defeated, but one would think 
that the fact it was even made—by Gerry no less—demonstrates that there
was no universal understanding that the First Amendment protected
anonymous speech. Thomas tells a similar story of the Upper House of the 
New Jersey Legislature that was, in turn, defeated by the Lower House in
its attempts to identify an author.131 Despite these conflicts, Thomas offers
an unqualified conclusion: “[T]he Framers shared the belief that such
activity [of anonymous publication] was firmly part of the freedom of the
press.”132 
Third, there is the problem of what part of history matters. This is not
simply a question of whether we should look at history in the run up to the
ratification of the First Amendment but not after; or whether we should
look at history in the run up to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment but not after. Instead, the issue is more basic: whatever part
of history may be relevant, within that part, where should we look? In
McKee, Thomas cited a set of medieval statutes adopted to outlaw certain
criticisms of public officials as support for his thesis.133 But he largely
ignored that the statutes were rejected after the Glorious Revolution, fell
into disuse, and were repealed. In Rogers v. Grewal, a Second Amendment
case, Thomas took the opposite approach.134 There, he ignored that the 
statute was adopted, which would have cut in favor of the constitutionality
of gun regulations, dismissing it as being adopted “during a time of
political transition.”135 Instead, he focused on the statute’s ultimate demise
after the Glorious Revolution. And it was this history, Thomas said, that
mattered: “[F]or purposes of discerning the original meaning of the
Second Amendment, it is this founding era understanding that is most
pertinent.”136 These approaches are irreconcilable.
129. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 361–62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 361.
131. Id. at 362.
132. Id. at 367.
133. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 682 n.2 (2019).
134. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
135. Id. at 1869.
136. Id. at 1871.
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992021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
And, of course, there is the question of whether history should matter
at all.137 There are persuasive arguments that when it comes to questions
of speech, an originalist approach is the wrong approach: “[T]he meaning
of the First Amendment did not crystallize in 1791.”138 As Zechariah
Chafee Jr. observed early in the twentieth century, “The framers would
probably have been horrified at the thought of protecting books by Darwin
or Bernard Shaw, but ‘liberty of speech’ is no more confined to the speech
they thought permissible than ‘commerce’ in another clause is limited to
the sailing vessels and horse-drawn vehicles of 1787.”139 Freedom of the
press, after all, “was far from complete” in the Colonies.140 
While Thomas would argue that this lack of freedom supports his
thesis, this history makes Thomas’s wish for a return to a similar system
downright terrifying. Take, for example, the treatment of individuals
before and around the Founding. In 1661, the Massachusetts Bay
legislature ordered the suppression of a book, because it “advocated
popular election of officials.”141 One author in the colony spent a year in 
jail after criticizing ecclesiastical authorities.142 In 1722, the Pennsylvania
Council “barred a printer . . . from publishing without permission anything
that had to do with governmental affairs.”143 Unsurprisingly, in
Revolutionary America, “Tory printers were being harassed by mobs and
by the new state legislatures.”144 And by 1778, “every state had some form
of sedition law which was broadly interpreted to penalize open
denunciation of the patriot cause.”145 None of this is something we should
be trying to resurrect. Half the country would be in jail.
This approach, if adopted throughout the Court’s First Amendment
canon, would also require throwing out most of the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor Dorf said, “First Amendment
doctrine is pervasively nonoriginalist. . . . ‘If an originalist wanted First
Amendment doctrine to track Founder Era judicial reasoning, the Supreme
137. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 233 (2013) (“originalism
is fake”).
138. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2d ed.
1967).
139. Id.; see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (en banc).
140. Jerome Lawrence Merin, The Supreme Court and Libel, 11 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 371, 373 (1969).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 374.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 376.
145. Id.
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100 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Court’s decisions in Texas v. Johnson, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 
Citizens United v. FEC, and Snyder v. Phelps, among many, many others,
would likely have to go.’”146 Thomas, Dorf noted, “joined the majority
opinion in every one of the specifically listed cases except Johnson, which
was decided before he joined the Court.”147 It seems unlikely though that
Thomas would revisit these decisions. And, until he can explain the
difference in treatment, a full-throated application of originalist
interpretation in this corner of the cannon lacks intellectual merit.
Additionally, an application of originalism to the First Amendment is
especially problematic, because what presumably should matter most— 
the debates surrounding that Amendment’s adoption—is universally
agreed to be unclear.148 Any serious scholar who has studied the adoption
of the First Amendment has admitted this. As Leonard Levy said, “The
Congressional debate on the amendment . . . was unclear and apathetic;
ambiguity, brevity and imprecision in thought and expression characterize
the comments of the few members who spoke.”149 Jerome Lawrence
Merin, who made an early historical assessment of Sullivan, wrote
similarly, “The debates in Congress and in the states over the Bill of
Rights . . . give us little clue as to what the framers had in mind when they
stated that Congress should make no law abridging freedom of the
press.”150 The Court and various justices have also accepted this view.151 
With those clarifications and qualifications out of the way, what
follows is an examination of historical support for the originalist case
against Sullivan. It is divided into four parts. First, Part III reviews some
early influential cases demonstrating that far from freedom of the press
developing against the backdrop of the common law of libel, the opposite
was true. At the Founding and shortly after, courts were cultivating an
American understanding of the freedom of the press and libel. Second, Part
146. Michael C. Dorf, Justice Thomas’s Faux-Originalist Critique of 
Overbreadth is Radically Underinclusive (and Wrongheaded in Other Ways Too), 
DORF ON L. (May 11, 2020), www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/05/justice-thomass-faux-
originalist.html [https://perma.cc/B22L-CY8W] (first citing Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989); then citing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000); then citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); and then citing
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)).
147. Id.
148. Merin, supra note 140, at 378.
149. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 224 (1960).
150. Merin, supra note 140, at 377.
151. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 381–84 n.6 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting).
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1012021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
IV takes on some specifics of Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s arguments,
explaining the shortcomings of their views on the treatment of public-
official libel plaintiffs historically. Part V considers the historical support
for extending rules adopted for public officials to public figures. Part VI
sows doubt about the influence of Blackstone and other English authorities
in debates about freedom of the press in the United States. Finally, Part
VII cleans up some other minor historical arguments advanced by Thomas
and some pragmatic ones advanced by Gorsuch.
III. REPUBLICANISM AND THE COMMON LAW OF LIBEL
We begin where Thomas and Gorsuch did: the premise that Sullivan 
cannot be reconciled with an originalist understanding of the First
Amendment. In McKee, Thomas marshalled the lion’s share of historical
support for that premise; in Berisha, Gorsuch followed, adding in some
throwaway citations to Blackstone and Story. While there is much in the
historical record that counters this evidence, we begin with the big picture:
did the Founders and early Americans intend after the Revolution to 
transplant the entirety of English common law of libel? The short answer
is no: “[o]ne of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English
common law on liberty of speech and of the press.”152 
While there is considerable scholarly support for this conclusion,153 
this Part focuses on three early libel cases on which Thomas himself
relied—each of which is emblematic of the troubles English libel law
faced in a young United States: Commonwealth v. Clap, People v.
Croswell, and Lewis v. Few.154 These cases, from New York and 
Massachusetts, demonstrate two things. First, as a doctrinal matter, they
demonstrate how early courts grappled with questions about the role of
truth and falsity in libel (Clap) and questions about the relevance of one’s
intent (Croswell and Lewis). It turns out, contrary to Thomas’s suggestion
otherwise, courts focused on both questions to ensure that freedom of the
press was not trammeled on by the common law of libel.
Second, these cases demonstrate how early state courts struggled to 
reconcile the brutish nature of English libel law with a new constitution
152. Henry Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 PROC. AM.
SOC. SOC’Y 67, 76 (1914).
153. Id. at 80 (observing that the “true view of the original declarations of
liberty of the press would appear to be, then, that they wiped out the English
common law”).
154. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns.
Cas. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  106 11/19/21  12:00 PM




   
  
    
 
     
  
    





      
     
   
 
  
    
    
     
  
    
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
    
 
     
    
   
   
      
 
      
   
   
102 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
that guaranteed a “Republican form of Government.”155 In departing from
the common law of England, these courts did so precisely because
following it would be incompatible with the nature of government that the
States adopted after the Revolution. True, there were no good answers
early on. It was hard for the States, and the conservative judiciaries that
occupied their benches, to cleave themselves entirely from the English
common law. But even if they did not cleave, through these cases they
whittled away at it, sanded smooth its rough edges with the commitment
to freedom of the press, and carved a decidedly American law of libel.
A. Commonwealth v. Clap
Let’s start with the 1808 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case
of Commonwealth v. Clap. In Clap, authorities indicted the defendant for
libeling an auctioneer, considered a public official at the time, with the
charge that he was “a liar, a scoundrel, a cheat, and a swindler.”156 The 
issue was, because the auctioneer was a public official, whether the
criminal defendant should be able to offer evidence demonstrating that the
charge was true.157 
In McKee, Thomas cited Clap because the Massachusetts court wrote 
that libels against public officials were “most dangerous to the people.”158 
But Thomas missed what is actually important about Clap: its concern
about protecting a sphere of public debate from the common law of libel
such that the People could criticize their public officials. Indeed, Clap is
representative of early conflicts between the enforcement of the law of
libel and the desire to protect the political debate necessary for a
republican form of government. Far from supporting Thomas’s thesis, it
cuts against him.
At common law, truth was no defense to a criminal libel charge. As
the saying goes: the greater the truth, the greater the libel.159 All that was
required to secure a conviction in front of a jury was a showing that the 
libel was published.160 But counsel for Clap questioned the application of
155. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
156. Clap, 4 Mass. at 163.
157. Id. at 168.
158. Id. at 169.
159. Id.; see also Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,
260 (1916).
160. Clap, 4 Mass. at 168; see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF
SPEECH 19 (1920) (noting that one of the early conflicts in the United States
surrounding the law of libel was “first, that the jury and not the judge ought to
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1032021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
these rules in a republican democracy like the United States. He argued
that to the extent the common law was against him, it “was virtually
repealed by the provisions of the constitution of this commonwealth; and
he went much at large into the consideration of the right of the citizens of
a free elective republic to speak and publish the truth respecting the
characters of men in office.”161 The reason for this freedom was simple:
“[t]he community [has] an interest in his integrity, and [has] a right to be
informed what his conduct in office is, that they may judge whether it be
safe and discreet to intrust their property to his care and management.”162 
It was, thus, “of much greater importance that this high constitutional
privilege be preserved unimpaired, than that a libeller should now and then 
go unpunished.”163 
While the solicitor general said that “he had never known a decision
that the truth might be given in evidence,” even in cases concerning the
libel on a public official, he admitted that “whenever he had had the
direction of prosecutions of this kind, he had always yielded to such a
defence without opposition.”164 In fact, he had “even courted” defendants
“to attempt a defence of this kind.”165 The attorney general agreed as well, 
but argued that the auctioneer was not a public official:
As to public men, the measures of government, and candidates for
public offices, the Attorney-General said he had always held the
people to be their proper and constitutional judges; and he never
should, while he held his present office, oppose the giving of the
truth in evidence to justify any publications charged as libellous
in relation to those objects.166 
It was only in that case that he did not believe the victim of the libel—an 
auctioneer—should be considered a public official.167 
The court sided with the Commonwealth. It agreed with the attorney
general that the auctioneer, as a mere appointed officer, rather than an
elected one, was not a public official. As a result, the republican principles
about holding public officials accountable were irrelevant. Thus, the court
decide the libellous nature of the writing, and secondly, that the truth of the charge
ought to prevent conviction”).





166. Id. at 167.
167. Id.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  108 11/19/21  12:00 PM






   
 
 
   
  
     
   
     
   
    
   
   
   
   
 
       
  
  
   
 
    
  









   
   
   
   
   
   
104 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
applied the traditional rules of the common law of libel, i.e., that truth was
irrelevant in criminal libel cases:
[I]t is not considered whether the publication be true or false;
because a man may maliciously publish the truth against another,
with the intent to defame his character, and if the publication be
true, the tendency of it to inflame the passions, and to excite
revenge, is not diminished, but may sometimes be strengthened.168 
Moreover, were truth allowed to be proven at trial, the victim of the libel,
who in the criminal prosecution for that libel is not a party, might suffer
admission of “evidence at the trial [that] might more cruelly defame his
character than the original libel.”169 
But, in dicta, Clap then suggested an alteration of the common law by
finding that in some cases, truth might still be offered in justification
because of the very republican principles Clap’s counsel had advocated. 
As the court explained, “the defendant may repel the charge, by proving 
that the publication was for a justifiable purpose, and not malicious, nor
with the intent to defame any man.”170 In this effort to prove that the
conduct was justified, the court found that “there may be cases, where the
defendant . . . may give in evidence the truth of the words, when such
evidence will tend to negative the malice and intent to defame.”171 “Upon 
this principle,” the court wrote, “a man may apply by complaint to the
legislature to remove an unworthy officer; and if the complaint be true,
and made with the honest intention of giving useful information, and not
maliciously, or with intent to defame, the complaint will not be a libel.”172 
Importantly, the court explained why a defendant should not be
deprived of the right to prove truth in all cases: “[W]hen any man shall
consent to be a candidate for a public office conferred by the election of
the people, he must be considered as putting his character in issue, so far
as it may respect his fitness and qualifications for the office.”173 Echoing
Clap’s arguments, the court then held that “publications of the truth on this
subject, with the honest intention of informing the people, are not a libel.
For it would be unreasonable to conclude that the publication of truths,
which it is the interest of the people to know, should be an offence against
168. Id. at 168.




173. Id. (emphasis added).
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1052021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
their laws.”174 Far from reinforcing the common law then, the court’s
“novel dictum that publication of truth as to the characters of elective
officers, or of candidates for such office, was not a libel” was a “judicial
enlargement of the freedom of the press.”175 
In McKee, Thomas ignored the Clap court’s embrace of republican
principles as a limit on defamation law. He focused instead on what Clap
said about false charges after announcing the new limitation on libel law:
For the same reason, the publication of falsehood and calumny
against public officers, or candidates for public offices, is an
offence most dangerous to the people, and deserves punishment,
because the people may be deceived, and reject the best citizens,
to their great injury, and it may be to the loss of their liberties.176 
But even this does not carry Thomas far. Clap held that false statements
relating to public officials were unprotected “for the same reason” that
truthful ones should be considered protected.177 Clap did not find false 
statements “most dangerous” for the common law reason that truthful
charges were just as likely to result in violence as false ones were or 
because of the supposed common law rule that public officials were 
inherently deserving of more protection than others.178 Rather, it found
false statements unprotected because of their tendency to undermine
republican debate.
In this way, the court’s logic in Clap had one vitally important thing 
in common with Sullivan: the common law of libel must be considered
against the backdrop of republican principles. This was an early American
way of thinking about libel. Sullivan did not depart from an original
understanding of the common law; it was an iteration of the same ideas
that courts and counsel had developed some 150 years prior. While
reaching different results, both Sullivan and Clap recognized that speech 
about public officials necessitated greater protection because it was 
different in kind than speech about private figures. One implicated the
public’s interests; the other did not. And in the case of speech about public
officials, both Sullivan and Clap sought to protect the “free trade in ideas”
within “the competition of the market” by easing the rules of the common
law of libel. The difference between Sullivan and Clap was that Sullivan 
174. Id.
175. CLYDE AUGUSTUS DUNIWAY, DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN MASSACHUSETTS 152 (1906).
176. Clap, 4 Mass. at 169–70.
177. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 169.
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106 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
aimed to protect inputs (the introduction of new ideas into the market) 
while Clap aimed to protect outputs (the result of the competition)—while
English law, on which both Thomas and Gorsuch lean so strongly, cared
about neither.
B. People v. Croswell
In 1804, the New York Supreme Court—the State’s highest court at 
that time—decided an “interesting and celebrated” case on “a very
important and much litigated subject of jurisprudence.”179 Harry Croswell,
a New York printer, had published allegations in The Wasp that Thomas
Jefferson had paid James Callendar, a prominent republican printer, to call
George Washington “a traitor, a robber, and a perjurer” and John Adams
“a hoary-headed incendiary.”180 Croswell asked that the trial be delayed 
until he could have Callendar, who would prove that the allegations were
true, travel from Virginia.181 The judge refused, and at trial, the jury found
Croswell guilty, having been instructed that “it was no part of the province
of a jury to inquire or decide on the intent of the defendant; or whether the
publication in question was true, or false, or malicious.”182 The only 
question for the jury was whether Croswell published the allegations in his
newspaper.183 
On appeal, as in Clap, the issue was again whether “the defendant
[may] give the truth in evidence.”184 A separate issue was whether it was
the province of the jury to decide both law, i.e., the existence of a malicious
falsehood, and fact, i.e., publication by the defendant.185 Alexander
Hamilton, who was one of New York’s delegates at the Constitutional
Convention, defended Croswell on appeal. Hamilton’s defense of
Croswell is one of the great early examples of American understandings
of freedom of the press. He began with the question of whether evidence
of truth should be allowed. He argued that it should. The doctrine of the 
greater the truth, greater the libel, he said, “originated in a polluted source, 
the despotic tribunal of the Star Chamber.”186 Since the earliest days of
England, the defendant had been allowed to prove the truth of the charge,
and to the extent that later authority was to the contrary, it came from the
179. WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 377 (1907).
180. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 342.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 337.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 344.
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1072021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Star Chamber and could not alter the common law.187 Even the Sedition
Act, Hamilton argued, required that falsity must be proven.188 Hamilton
also argued that “the court cannot judge of that intent.”189 Instead, “the jury
must find it.”190 The “intent constitutes [the] crime” in libel cases, because
the act of printing itself is not unlawful.191 On this question, the “time and
circumstances” of the alleged libel are “very material.”192 Thus, a jury 
must be able to inquire into the context in which the alleged libel was
printed.
On reply to the attorney general’s arguments, Hamilton proposed a
new standard for freedom of the press: “The liberty of the press consisted
in publishing with impunity, truth with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, whether it related to [public] men or to measures.”193 This, he argued,
was necessary in a government where the governors were representatives
of the People:
To discuss measures without reference to men, was impracticable.
Why examine measures, but to prove them bad, and to point out
their pernicious authors, so that the people might correct the evil
by removing the men? There was no other way to preserve liberty,
and bring down a tyrannical faction. If this right was not permitted
to exist in vigour and in exercise, good men would become silent;
corruption and tyranny would go on, step by step, in usurpation,
until, at last, nothing that was worth speaking, or writing, or acting
for, would be left in our country.194 
Nor did intent stand separate from truth, Hamilton said. Instead, “[t]he
question how far the truth is to be given in evidence, depends much on the
question of intent . . . .”195 And if the jury must decide intent, as Hamilton
argued, it must also be able to pass on the truth or falsity of the charge,
because truth is a “requisite,” a “means to determine the intent.”196 From
187. Id.
188. Id.




193. Id. at 352 (emphasis added); see also Schofield, supra note 152, at 89 
(“He professed that he found or discovered this definition in the English common-
law. But it was not there.”).
194. Id. at 352–53.
195. Id. at 356.
196. Id. at 356–57.
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108 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
the Roman Empire forward, Hamilton asserted, “falsity was an ingredient
in the crime,” and the common law continued to require it.197 
New York’s arguments to the contrary, Hamilton said, were derived
from the “polluted source” of the Star Chamber.198 That was not “the court
from which we are to expect principles and precedents friendly to
freedom.”199 Instead, it was the “most arbitrary, tyrannical and hated
tribunal.”200 Being able to give truth in evidence, on the other hand, was
“all-important to the liberties of the people,” because truth was “an
ingredient in the eternal order of things.”201 Hamilton, ever the Federalist,
thus “felt a proud elevation of sentiment” in the Sedition Act having
“established this great vital principle.”202 Hamilton concluded that being
allowed a defense of truth was “essential to the preservation of a free
government; the disallowance of it fatal.”203 
The court split 2–2, leaving Croswell’s conviction in place, and no
judgment was issued. Morgan Lewis, the chief judge and a Jeffersonian,
along with Brockholst Livingston, who would soon become an associate
justice on the Supreme Court, would have adopted the common law view
that truth was not a defense.204 However, Judge James Kent, a Federalist, 
and his colleague Smith Thompson, a Democratic-Republican who had
come up in the bar with Kent and would also become an associate justice,
would have adopted Hamilton’s proposed truth-and-good-motives
standard.205 
Like the opinion in Clap, Kent’s opinion in Croswell is some of the
best evidence of the early debates over the collision of libel law and
freedom of the press in a republic. More importantly, it is the best evidence
of whether and why courts thought a publisher’s intent was important. 
Libel, Kent observed at the outset, “is a defamatory publication, made with
a malicious intent.”206 Where the jury found that the defendant published
the libel, malice was presumed to exist. But Kent questioned whether
malice should be presumed: “There can be no crime without an evil
mind.”207 Kent thought the jury should have the chance to decide
197. Id. at 357.
198. Id. 




203. Id. at 360.
204. Id. at 394–411 (Lewis, J.); id. at 411–13 (Livingston, J.).
205. Id. at 363–94 (Kent, J.).
206. Id. at 377.
207. Id. at 364.
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1092021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
(1) whether the defendant published the libel and (2) the “particular intent
and tendency that constituted the libel.”208 
Kent believed that the jury should be given the chance to decide both
questions because, echoing Hamilton, “[o]pinions and acts may be
innocent under one set of circumstances, and criminal under another.”209 
As he explained:
[W]hat can be a more important circumstance than the truth of the
charge, to determine the goodness of the motive in making it, if it
be a charge against the competency or purity of a character in
public trust, or of a candidate for public favour, or a charge of
actions in which the community have an interest, and are deeply
concerned? To shut out wholly the inquiry into the truth of the
accusation, is to abridge essentially the means of defence. It is to
weaken the arm of the defendant, and to convict him, by means of
a presumption [of malice], which he might easily destroy by proof
that the charge was true, and that, considering the nature of the
accusation, the circumstances and time under which it was made,
and the situation of the person implicated, his motive could have
been no other than a pure and disinterested regard for the public
welfare.210 
When it came to “public libel,” falsehood had always been “a material
ingredient” in a prosecution.211 Agreeing with Hamilton, Kent said that the
civil law—that is, law descending from the Romans as opposed to the
common law descending from the English—had long permitted truth as a
defense in cases reaching public persons.212 English courts too—despite
the Star Chamber—had “occasionally admitted” it.213 And in “this
country,” the rule had “taken firmer root”: “in regard to the measures of
government, and the character and qualifications of candidates for public 
trust, it is considered as the vital support of the liberty of the press.”214 
To the extent that English law was not in accord, Kent rejected it. The 
Star Chamber, which denied truth as a defense at the height of its “terrors,”
was an outlier.215 And its doctrine of the greater the truth the greater the
208. Id.
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 377–78.
211. Id. at 379.
212. Id. at 383.
213. Id. at 379.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 385.
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110 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
libel was incompatible with political debate in the States: “There be many
cases . . . where a man may do his country good service, by libelling; for
where a man is either too great, or his vices too general to be brought under
a judiciary accusation, there is no way but this extraordinary method of
accusation.”216 In other words, at times, people might have an affirmative
obligation to libel public officials.
Importantly, Kent then disavowed the common law altogether: “But,
whatever may be our opinion on the English law, there is another and a
very important view of the subject to be taken, and that is with respect to
the true standard of the freedom of the American press.”217 Unlike in
England, he wrote, “the people of this country have always classed the
freedom of the press among their fundamental rights.”218 The First
Congress, he pointed out, had placed freedom of the press as one of the
“five invaluable rights, without which a people cannot be free and
happy.”219 The importance of the freedom of the press consisted, Congress 
declared in 1774, “in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of government, its ready communication of thoughts
between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them,
whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.”220 In the New York
Ratifying Convention of 1788, the delegates declared that “the freedom of
the press was a right which could not be abridged or violated.”221 Kent 
observed that the “same opinion is contained in the amendment to the 
constitution of the United States, and to which this state was a party,” and 
in state constitutions, which already provided for truth as a defense in
criminal cases relating to public officials.222 Even the Sedition Act
provided truth as a defense.223 
Kent called these acts “the highest, the most solemn, and commanding
authorities, that the state or the nation can produce.”224 He said, “[I]t seems 
impossible that [the Founders] could have spoken with so much
explicitness and energy, if they had intended nothing more than that
restricted and slavish press [in England], which may not publish any thing,
216. Id. at 381.
217. Id. at 390–91.
218. Id. at 391.
219. Id.
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis omitted).
223. Id. at 392.
224. Id.
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1112021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
true or false, that reflects on the character and administration of public
men.”225 Expanding on this sentiment, he added:
And if the theory of the prevailing doctrine in England, (for even,
there it is now scarcely any thing more than theory,) had been
strictly put in practice with us, where would have been all those
enlightened and manly discussions which prepared and matured
the great events of our revolution, or which, in a more recent
period, pointed out the weakness and folly of the confederation,
and roused the nation to throw it aside, and to erect a better
government upon its ruins? They were, no doubt, libels upon the
existing establishments, because they tended to defame them, and
to expose them to the contempt and hatred of the people. They
were, however, libels founded in truth, and dictated by worthy
motives.226 
Kent thus adopted, “as perfectly correct, the comprehensive and accurate
definition of one of the counsel at the bar, that the liberty of the press
consists in the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good motives,
and for justifiable ends, whether it respects government, magistracy, or
individuals.”227 
Kent’s opinion was a shockwave. It declared inapplicable the common
law of libel in England precisely because the United States was based on
a different kind of government requiring a different conception of freedom
of the press. And it was hugely influential. Kent and Hamilton’s rule ended
up being incorporated into several state constitutions—affirmative choices
by those states to depart from what the common law had been towards
something new.228 While the rule might seem less than protective today,
at the time, it was a giant leap forward and away from what the common
law of libel demanded. Hamilton’s rule was “forward-looking then,
regressive today, but in the surge of history, understandable.”229 
225. Id.
226. Id. at 392–93 (emphasis omitted).
227. Id. at 393–94 (emphasis omitted).
228. FREDERIC HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM 1690– 
1872, at 753–57 (1873) (listing provisions of various state constitutions).
229. Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell’s Case, 33 
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 439 n.97 (1965).
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112 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
C. Lewis v. Few
Lewis v. Few is a perfect example of the far reaching consequences
that putting intent into play had on the common law of libel.230 In 1809,
Morgan Lewis—as it happens, the same Morgan Lewis who voted against
Hamilton in Croswell—sued after William Few denounced Lewis’s
“attempts to destroy the liberty of the press” at a public meeting about the
upcoming election for governor and in the American Citizen newspaper.231 
By that time, Lewis had become Governor of New York, and Few charged
Lewis with “hostility towards the republican cause.”232 
Among other defenses, Few’s counsel sought an extension of Kent’s
observations in Croswell about the importance of intent. He argued that
the plaintiff must show that the words were false and that they were uttered 
with malicious intent to prevail.233 He thus carried Hamilton’s argument a 
step forward by arguing that intent might matter even when the statement
at issue is false. Pointing to a strand of the common law of England,
counsel drew an analogy between the servant/master privilege that had
been developing there and the governor/governed privilege in the United
States: “Where words are spoken . . . bona fide, by a master, concerning
the character of a servant, though the specific acts or crimes are charged,
and which turn out to be false, yet no action lies.”234 In such cases, “[t]he 
words must be proved to be malicious, as well as false.”235 
In cases like the one before the court where the target of the alleged
libel was a public official, Few’s counsel argued that, consistent with this
principle from the common law, “[t]he people must be regarded as the
sovereign or master, and the persons elected as their agents or servants.”236 
Continuing that line of reasoning, Few’s counsel argued, “It is essential,
in an elective government, that the people should be at liberty, bona fide, 
to express their opinions of any public officer, or candidate for office.”237 
As such, for Lewis to prevail, he would have to prove both that the charge
was false and that Few acted from bad motives.
Lewis’s counsel did not appreciate Few’s attempt to import the
servant/master privilege into the context of libels on public officials and
extend Hamilton’s rule even further. As he put it, “[T]he defence now set
230. Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
231. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
232. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
233. Id. at 13–14.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 14.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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1132021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
up, [that is, a showing that a charge was both false and malicious,] was
never thought of [in Croswell, and it seemed] to have been reserved for
the ingenuity of . . . defendant’s counsel here, to suggest this new doctrine
for the first time.”238 The People, Lewis’s counsel said, “may freely speak,
and publish the truth, and the whole truth: but this cannot authorize them
to publish falsehoods . . . concerning public candidates.”239 
The court sided with Lewis. Thompson, the judge in Croswell who 
voted with Kent, delivered the opinion.240 It was argued, Thompson wrote,
that “being the act of a public meeting . . . and the publication being
against a candidate for a public office . . . afford[ed] a complete 
justification” to the libel.241 Essentially, the defendant was asking for a
libel-free zone where allegations made against a public official at a public
meeting “is beyond the reach of legal inquiry.”242 To this, Thompson said, 
he could “never yield [his] assent.”243 Thompson thus rejected the analogy
to the servant/master privilege, writing that he could not find “any analogy
whatever” to support the argument advanced.244 To be sure, citizens had a 
“right to assemble, and freely and openly to examine the fitness and
qualifications of candidates for public offices, and communicate their
opinions to others,” but, in doing so, they must not “transcend the bounds
of truth.”245 He added, “[T]here is a wide difference between this privilege, 
and a right irresponsibly to charge a candidate with direct, specific and
unfounded crimes.”246 
While he did not accept that a false charge uttered bona fide could be
privileged, Thompson did accept that it could mitigate damages—a still 
nascent idea both in England and in the United States.247 Although that
issue was not before the court, Thompson wrote, “Every case must
necessarily, from the nature of the action, depend on its own
circumstances, which are to be submitted to the sound discretion of the
jury. It is difficult, and perhaps impracticable, to prescribe any general rule
on the subject.”248 Thus, while Few did not win on liability, Thompson
opened the door to reduced damages on remand—one of the earliest cases
238. Id. at 20.
239. Id. at 20–21.
240. Id. at 28–37.
241. Id. at 35–36.





247. Id. at 37.
248. Id.
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114 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
in the States to do so—based on the republican circumstances in which the
libel was uttered.
Lewis was a bookend on these early cases. While the rule prevailing
at common law was that even truth was no defense to a libel, Lewis and 
these other cases show early courts realizing that for a republican
government to be successful, some of the more draconian aspects of libel
law had to be relaxed. And while in a monarchical England it may well
have made sense that the common law of libel was enforced with an iron
fist when it came to libels on magistrates, i.e., public men, such rules made
little sense in the United States, where the governors did not rule over the
people but were agents of them. In this way, these cases remind us of what
Justice Story once said: “The common law of England is not to be taken
in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its
general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with 
them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their
situation.”249 In the place of those parts left behind, early courts injected
principles like truth and intent—principles that provided play in the joints
between the common law’s speech-suppressing tendencies and a
republican form of government that requires speech to work.
One cannot then read these cases and agree with Thomas’s and 
Gorsuch’s assertions that freedom of the press simply developed against a
backdrop of the English common law of libel.250 It simply is not the case,
as Thomas claimed, that the “Court’s pronouncement that the First
Amendment requires public figures to establish actual malice bears ‘no
relation to the text, history, or structure of the Constitution.’”251 These 
cases, and others like them, demonstrate that the law of libel in the United
States developed against a backdrop of republican principles of freedom
of the press under the First Amendment. Put differently, these cases show
that freedom of the press diffused through the law of libel to enable self-
government rather than develop around it.
Of course, Clap, Croswell, and Lewis are just three early cases among
many. Many courts did impose the common law of libel as adopted in
England on the newly minted American citizens. As one commentator
lamented, “Our own judges seem to have forgotten that the founders of the
government are not distinguished for their reception of the English
common law but for their adaptation of the democratic leaning and
tendency of the constitutional side of it to a new career of popular freedom
249. Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 144 (1829) (emphasis added).
250. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019).
251. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021).
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1152021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
and equal justice.”252 Nevertheless, cases like Clap, Croswell, and Lewis
demonstrate that there was no unanimity on this point as Thomas suggests.
True enough, none of these courts adopted Sullivan’s actual-malice 
rule—although counsel in Lewis essentially argued for it some 150 years
before Sullivan. But these decisions display glimmers of the
considerations about intent and falsity and republicanism that would come
to the fore in Sullivan and, as we will see, long before Sullivan too. There
is no reasonable argument that it was only the Supreme Court in the last
half of the twentieth century that thought a conflict between libel law and
freedom of the press existed. They have always chased each other’s
shadows.
IV. PUBLIC-OFFICIAL LIBEL PLAINTIFFS
Turning to specifics, both Thomas and Gorsuch suggested that there 
is irrefutable evidence that the Sullivan Court made up, out of whole cloth,
the actual-malice rule. As Thomas explained, Sullivan was a “policy-
driven decision[] masquerading as constitutional law.”253 Gorsuch made
similar observations, albeit less strident. Both are ahistorical. As we have
already seen, the Sullivan Court was not the first to consider the impact of
a lack of fault in a libel case concerning public officials, even when the
defendant could not defend his or her case on the grounds of truth. 
In this section, we dig into more of these early cases, which run from
the eighteenth century on into the nineteenth and can be divided into two
classes. First, there are those cases that found that a defendant’s lack of
actual malice might mitigate damages—much like Thompson suggested
in Lewis. Second, there are those that went further and recognized a
privilege in cases involving public-official plaintiffs whereby a defendant
could escape liability so long as he had reasonable cause to believe an
allegation was true—even where it turned out to be false. Each of these
lines of cases, while not establishing the actual-malice rule as it exists
today, are the precursors to it. 
A. Absence of Actual Malice in Mitigation
By the late eighteenth century, libel law was rapidly developing in
England. In 1792, Parliament adopted Fox’s Act, which gave power back
to the jury to issue a general verdict. No longer was the jury, even in
England, relegated to deciding only whether the defendant published the
libel. The changes, however, were not limited to Parliament, as the courts
252. Schofield, supra note 152, at 83.
253. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 676.
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116 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
in England also began liberalizing the common law of libel. A prime
example is the case of Knobell v. Fuller.254 
In Knobell, the defendant was a conservative daily news organization:
The Morning Post.255 The alleged defamation was that Knobell, along with
a co-conspirator, had swindled money from friends and family of felons
in exchange for securing pardons.256 The co-conspirator was charged for
the crime, but Knobell was not.257 While the newspaper could not muster
proof that the allegations against Knobell were true, it nevertheless sought
to offer as mitigating evidence that there were “strong grounds of
suspicion against” Knobell.258 As defense counsel explained, “[T]hey 
might prove facts which showed there was cause of suspicion, and
therefore proved that the defendants were not induced to publish this paper
by reason of malice against the plaintiff.”259 Instead, the evidence would
show that they published “for the purpose of conveying information to the
public, this being a concern of a public nature.”260 This, counsel argued, 
should reduce the damages—even though it could not absolve the paper
of guilt altogether.
Chief Judge James Eyre agreed, holding that evidence tending to show
a belief in the truth of the allegations could be admitted to mitigate
damages.261 He thus admitted the evidence and allowed defense counsel to
call two witnesses to demonstrate that Knobell was implicated in the
scheme, although he turned out not to be a part of it.262 The jury then found
in favor of Knobell and awarded him 200 shillings.263 While the press lost
the battle that day, a war was won. Knobell v. Fuller established the rule— 
for the first time—that a journalist’s intent in publishing the news was
relevant insofar as it might be offered to reduce damages. The value
judgment made sense: of course there is a material difference between a
defamatory statement that was a mistake and one that was an outright lie.
By 1803, the principle in Knobell found its way across the Atlantic. In
Kennedy v. Gregory, decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a
schoolmaster sued after being labeled a drunk.264 At the trial court, as in 





259. Id. at § xciii.
260. Id.
261. Id. at § xciii–xciv.
262. Id. at § xciv.
263. Id.
264. Kennedy v. Gregory, 1 Binn. 85, 86 (Pa. 1803).
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1172021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Knobell, the defendant attempted to offer evidence that the charge was not
fabricated.265 Instead, he had been told by another that Kennedy had a 
reputation for drinking.266 The court, however, did not permit the evidence,
and the jury found in favor of Kennedy.267 
The verdict did not survive the appeal though. Rather, two of the three
justices found that the evidence of Kennedy’s reputation should have been
admitted: it was relevant that the defendant be able to produce evidence
that he had been told that Kennedy had a reputation for drinking “to take
off all presumption that the charge was a fabrication of his own.”268 As the
court had in Knobell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that
there was a difference in fault as between a wholly fabricated charge and
a charge made in reliance on another source, even if ultimately wrong.
Courts in Pennsylvania repeatedly allowed evidence showing that the
defendant believed the charge even if he was ultimately mistaken. In 1806,
a court found that the defendant should be allowed to “give evidence of
circumstances which had induced a suspicion of felony” by the plaintiff.269 
And in 1808, the court agreed with William Duane, the firebrand publisher
of the Aurora, who had argued for the application of the principle:
Can it be, that like damages should be given against two
defendants, one of whom received his information from such
sources as were entitled to a certain degree of credit, while the
other devised it by his own wicked imagination? I think it cannot.
Such evidence certainly goes to the degree of malice . . . .270 
Nor was the principle limited to Pennsylvania. In Larned v. Buffinton, 
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had stolen his horses.271 At trial in
1807, the defendant argued that he should be allowed to submit evidence
of his belief in the charge to mitigate damages.272 The Massachusetts trial
court, however, refused to hear it.273 As in Kennedy, the ruling was
reversed on appeal: “When, through the fault of the plaintiff, the
defendant . . . at the time of speaking the words . . . had good cause to




268. Id. at 87.
269. Id. at 90 n.a.
270. Id.
271. Larned v. Buffinton, 3 Mass. 546, 550 (1807).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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118 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
consideration this misconduct of the plaintiff to mitigate the damages.”274 
Likewise, in South Carolina, a defendant could show “a ground of
suspicion” for the charge to reduce damages.275 The same rule was
recognized in Connecticut.276 In Ohio, damages could be mitigated by 
“[a]ny circumstance, therefore, tending to show that the defendant spoke
the words under a mistake, or that he had some reason to believe they were
true.”277 In Indiana, “general rumors, or a general suspicion of the guilt of
the plaintiff of the crime imputed to him by the defendant, may be given
in evidence in mitigation of damages.”278 
The thrust of this early doctrine is remarkably similar to that of today’s
actual-malice rule: courts must consider a defendant’s state of mind at the
time of publication in order to assess the degree of fault that accompanied
the libel. And as the law developed, this idea, paired with a recognition of
the social importance of statements about matters of public concern, would
transform into a privilege closer to the one we know today, becoming a
bar to liability. Thomas and Gorsuch, however, failed to wrestle with this
early case law or the case law that developed shortly thereafter that barred
recovery in public-official cases, even in cases of falsity, so long as the 
falsity was the result of an honest mistake.
B. Absence of Actual Malice as a Bar to Liability
Although the court in Lewis v. Few rejected Few’s argument in favor
of privileged falsity, the analogy that Few’s counsel offered between the 
master/servant privilege and the governed/governor privilege was hard to
shake. If the People are the masters of their government, and their
representatives in government are their servants, the People should be 
privileged to discuss their servants’ conduct just as masters were
privileged in statements about servants. But the idea, however sensible,
was also radical. As we saw in Part V, courts in the early nineteenth
century were struggling with how or whether they could honor the gaudy
274. Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
275. Buford v. McLuny, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 268, 271 (1818) (“A
person may prove, in mitigation of damages, such facts and circumstances as 
show a ground of suspicion, not amounting to actual proof of plaintiff’s guilt.”);
see also Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613, 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827); Gilman v. Lowell,
8 Wend. 573, 583 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Beehler v. Steever, 2 Whart. 313, 326
(Pa. 1837).
276. Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17, 25 (1821) (“ground of suspicion of their
truth, may be proved in mitigation of damages”).
277. Wilson v. Apple, 3 Ohio 270, 271 (1827).
278. Sanders v. Johnson, 6 Blackf. 50, 54 (Ind. 1841).
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1192021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
relics of the common law that made public discussion about public men
dangerous in a system of government reliant on that very discussion.
Still, given time, courts would come to endorse Few’s counsel’s once-
radical approach. As one legal review confirmed in 1889, “[T]he rules of 
the modern law governing the right of discussion of public men . . . gives
large play to the expression of honest and candid opinion, even if this be
at times mistaken and unjust.”279 To the extent that not all states subscribed
to this approach, that review argued that change to the law “should
certainly not consist in narrowing, but rather in still further widening its
scope.”280 
As with an absence of actual malice in mitigation of damages, the
master/servant privilege adopted in these cases also came from a leading 
case in England, Weatherston v. Hawkins.281 In that 1785 case, Hawkins
sent his servant, Weatherston, to buy a few books at the local market.282 
Hawkins, “more curious” than he sometimes was, looked over the
servant’s account “article by article, and in one, a book [he] well knew the
price of, [he] found [the servant] had charged [him] one shilling more than
it cost, and that shilling he kept in his pocket.”283 Hawkins then relayed 
this assessment in a letter to an acquaintance who was considering hiring
Weatherston.284 
Weatherston brought a defamation lawsuit based on the allegations.
At trial, Hawkins did not attempt to show that the charge was true as,
evidently, it was not, despite Hawkins’s prior math, and the jury found in
favor of Weatherston.285 On appeal, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, having
heard from Weatherston’s counsel, did not even let the defendant’s
barrister speak. Instead, he said:
I have held more than once that an action will not lie by a servant
against his former master for words spoken by him in giving a
character of the servant. . . . to every libel there may be a necessary
and implied justification . . . . Words may . . . be justified on
account of the subject-matter, or other circumstances.”286 
279. Chase, supra note 42, at 367 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 368.
281. Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1, 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (citing Weatherston v.
Hawkins (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 110 (KB)).




286. Id. at 112.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  124 11/19/21  12:00 PM




   
   
  
    
 
   
 
 
    
  








   
   
    
 
  
      
   
  
   
     







   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
120 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Where it was a master providing an assessment of a servant in response to
another seeking a reference, he thought it should be privileged.287 
As discussed, the logic of Weatherston, in the republican United 
States, would soon prove influential. Although Few’s counsel in Lewis
appears to have been the first in attempting to draw the analogy, he was
not the last. In the 1830s, in State v. Burnham, the defendant in a criminal
libel prosecution alleged that the lawyer for Strafford County was
“intemperate” and “incompetent to the discharge of the duties of his said
office.”288 This was not some offhand remark; the defendant printed two
hundred copies of it and sent it to his fellow citizens.289 At trial, the
defendant argued that if he made the charges against the lawyer “in good
faith, with pure motives, and upon probable grounds” to believe it, then it
was irrelevant whether the charge was true.290 
Unlike in Lewis, the court accepted the argument. As the Superior
Court of Judicature of New Hampshire explained, “[I]t is not expedient
that the errors, or foibles, or even the crimes of individuals, should be
made the subject of written publication, except for the purpose of
answering some good end.”291 Elaborating on the exception, it found that
Hamilton’s rule—that freedom of press meant the freedom to publish the
truth from good motives—was too narrow.292 Instead, a defendant could 
excuse his conduct if, “upon a lawful occasion, [he] proceeded with good 
motives—upon probable grounds—upon reasons which were apparently
good, but upon a supposition which turns out to be unfounded.”293 In short,
the court held for the first time that falsity may be privileged and a lack of
actual malice might be a defense.
What were such lawful occasions? They included “removal of an
incompetent officer, [preventing] the election of an unsuitable person, or,
generally, to give useful information to the community . . . in order that
they may act upon such information.”294 That is, the court sought to protect
from liability allegations affecting a republican government. Recognizing
that it “would be an idle and vain attempt, to endeavor to reconcile all the
discussions in the books upon the subject,” the court expressed its
confidence that it had provided “sound practical rules, which, while they
give no countenance to defamation, protect all persons in publishing, upon
287. Id.
288. State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34 (1837).
289. Id. at 36.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 43.
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 41–42.
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1212021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
lawful occasions, the truth from whatever motives, and what they have
reason to believe the truth, if it is done with motives which will bear
examination.”295 
Burnham, like Weatherston before it, had staying power.296 Some 30
years later, during the Reconstruction, the Superior Court of Judicature of
New Hampshire doubled down. In Palmer v. City of Concord, the court
explained:
[I]n this country every citizen has the right to call . . . attention . . . 
to the mal-administration of public affairs or the misconduct of
public servants, if his real motive in so doing is to bring about a
reform of abuses, or to defeat the re-election or re-appointment of
an incompetent officer. If information given in good faith to a 
private individual of the misconduct of his servant is ‘privileged,’
equally so must be a communication to the voters of a nation
concerning the misconduct of those whom they are taxed to
support and whose continuance in any service virtually depends
on the national voice.297 
Other state courts adopted similar reasoning based either on the
master/servant analogy in Weatherston or on a rapidly developing, related 
privilege in England: “If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or
exigency, and honestly made, such communications [‘made by a person in
the discharge of some public . . . duty, whether legal or moral’] are
protected for the common convenience and welfare of society.”298 To offer
just one other example, take the Supreme Court of Texas in Express
Printing Co. v. Copeland: “Whatever pertains to the qualification of the
candidate for the office sought is a legitimate subject for discussion and
comment, provided that such discussion and comment is not extended
beyond the prescribed limits.”299 Those limits were that such discussion
“must be confined to the truth, or what in good faith and upon probable
cause is believed to be true.”300 Elaborating on its rationale, it explained, 
“In our form of government the supreme power is in the people; they create
offices and select the officers.”301 It then posed a rhetorical question:
295. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
296. For cases decided from 1837 to 1868 see, for example, Swan v. Tappan,
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 104 (1849); Reynolds v. Tucker, 6 Ohio St. 516 (1856);
Gassett v. Gilbert, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 94 (1856).
297. Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N.H. 211, 216 (1868).
298. Toogood v. Spyring (1834) 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (KB).
299. Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex. 354, 358 (1885).
300. Id.
301. Id.
360570-LSU_82-1_Text.indd  126 11/19/21  12:00 PM




   
 
 
    
 
 
   




   
     
  
   






      
 
 
   
       
      
     










    
     
 
     
     
122 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
“[A]re the people to be denied the right of discussion and comment
respecting the qualification or want of qualification of those who, by
consenting to become candidates, challenge the support of the people on
the ground of their peculiar fitness for the office sought?”302 
Courts in Iowa, Vermont, Minnesota, Michigan, Kansas, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota all adopted similar rules in public
official cases.303 That these cases exist, in legions, nonetheless, should not
be surprising. Sullivan itself noted the existence of a common law
“privilege immunizing honest misstatements of fact”—an accurate
assessment that belies Thomas’s assertion that the common law privilege
“applied only when the facts stated were true” or Gorsuch’s statement that
the controlling view of freedom of the press in the United States was that
of Blackstone: “if he publishes falsehoods ‘he must take the consequence
of his own temerity.’”304 
In Sullivan, Brennan discussed one such case that adopted an actual-
malice rule: the 1908 Kansas case Coleman v. MacLennan.305 In Coleman,
the Topeka State Journal published an article relating to certain school-
funding transactions directed by a commission on which plaintiff, the state
attorney general, sat. The Kansas Supreme Court posed the question as 
one of “utmost concern”: “What are the limitations upon the right of a
newspaper to discuss the official character and conduct of a public
official . . . ?”306 Noting that the state constitution protected “liberty of the 
press,” the court observed that “[f]requently it is said that the expression
302. Id.
303. Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa 533, 537 (1877) (county board supervisor) (“if
the words were spoken . . . without malice, in good faith, believing them to be
true, and having reasonable cause as a prudent, careful man to so believe . . . the 
defendant is not liable”); Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 511–12 (1879)
(clergyman) (adopting principle that “[i]f fairly warranted by any reasonable
occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for
the common convenience and welfare of society”); see also Marks v. Baker, 9 
N.W. 678 (Minn. 1881) (city treasurer); Miner v. Post & Trib. Co., 13 N.W. 773
(Mich. 1882) (police justice); State v. Balch, 2 P. 609 (Kan. 1884) (candidate for
county attorney); Kent v. Bongartz, 22 A. 1023 (R.I. 1885) (police officer); Briggs
v. Garrett, 2 A. 513 (Pa. 1886) (judge); McNally v. Burleigh, 39 A. 285 (Me.
1897) (deputy sheriff); Boucher v. Clark Pub. Co., 84 N.W. 237 (S.D. 1900)
(sheriff).
304. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.21
(1964), with McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 683 (2019), and Berisha v. Lawson, 
141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021).
305. Id. (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)).
306. Coleman, 98 P. at 283.
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1232021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
was used in the sense it bears in the common law.”307 This begged the
question though: “The common law at what stage of its development?”308 
“Certainly not,” the court said, when English settlers stepped foot on
the eastern shores of the continent in 1607—fifteen years before the first
newspaper would be published.309 At that time, English law was the stuff
of the Star Chamber and being “subservient to royal proclamations.”310 
Even after the Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, “Parliament assumed
the prerogative respecting the licensing of publications.”311 At this point
through the end of the century, the liberty of the press in England was
“more theoretical than actual on account of the harshness of the law of
libel.”312 
After reviewing the liberalization of defamation law through the
eighteenth century, the court admitted:
[T]he English law of defamation is not the deliberate product of
any period. It is a mass which has grown by aggregation . . . . The 
result is that perhaps no other branch of the law is as open to
criticism for its doubts and difficulties, its meaningless and
grotesque anomalies. 313 
The common law of defamation, the court said, “is, as a whole, absurd in
theory, and very often mischievous in its practical operation.”314 “The
result is,” it said, “that ‘liberty of the press’ is still an undefined term.”315 
Still, “[c]ertain boundaries are fairly discernible within which the
liberty must be displayed, but precise rules cannot be formulated in
advance to govern its exercise on particular occasions.”316 The 
“constitutional guaranty clearly” meant at least that there shall be no prior
restraints and that the press shall be free of court censorship.317 Early
commentators said the guarantee meant nothing more, but “later
commentators and later decisions maintain[ed] that it d[id] mean more.”318 











317. Id. at 284.
318. Id.
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124 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
believed that the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all
that is secured by the constitutional provisions.”319 The freedom of the 
press, as Cooley saw it, implied:
a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen may please,
and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing, except
so far as such publications, from their . . . scandalous character,
may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they 
may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary
interests of individuals.320 
But, the court said, there must be an exception when another interest
is considered: “Where the public welfare is concerned, the individual must
frequently endure injury to his reputation without remedy.”321 Indeed, 
“[i]n some situations an overmastering duty obliges a person to speak,
although his words bring another into disrepute.”322 In the court’s opinion,
one such occasion was speech regarding the qualifications of public
officials:
Under a form of government like our own there must be freedom
to canvass in good faith the worth of character and qualifications
of candidates for office, whether elective or appointive, and by
becoming a candidate, or allowing himself to be the candidate of
others, a man tenders as an issue to be tried out publicly before the
people or the appointing power his honesty, integrity, and fitness
for the office to be filled.323 
While this could inconvenience public officials and occasionally injure
their reputations, this injury was outweighed by “[t]he importance to the
state and to society” to discuss public officials’ qualifications.324 
Turning to the rule to be extrapolated from these principles, the court
explained, as so many courts had held before it, “[W]e think a person may
in good faith publish whatever he may honestly believe to be true . . . 
without committing any public offense, although what he publishes may
in fact not be true, and may be injurious to the character of others.”325 
Without allowing for honestly mistaken statements, the “liberty of press
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 285.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 286.
325. Id. at 287.
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1252021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
[would] be endangered if the discussion of such matters must be confined
to statements of demonstrable truth.”326 As the court explained, “If . . . the
author were obliged to justify every statement by evidence of its literal
truth, the liberty of public discussion would be unworthy of being named
as a privilege of value.”327 
Coleman was the intellectual capstone of early American cases that
had transformed the common law rules in Knobell and Weatherston into 
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press in the United States.328 
Together, these cases demonstrate that the common law of libel did
consider a lack of actual malice as a defense to a defamation claim by a
public official, even for false statements of fact—and did so precisely
because of the chilling effect that unrestrained libel lawsuits could have
on public discourse about political life. Thomas and Gorsuch are, thus,
mistaken on multiple counts. First, common law privileges “on public
questions and matters of public interest” were not “applied only when the
facts stated were true.”329 Second, the common law in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries did not “deem[] libels against public figures to be, if
anything, more serious and injurious than ordinary libels.”330 These cases
made it harder for such individuals to recover damages—not easier.
In 1888, Newspaper Libel, A Handbook for the Press hit the shelves.
At a slim 300 pages, it billed itself as the first “convenient [legal] reference
[for] newspaper offices.”331 In the chapter “Political Libels,” the handbook
advised its readers, “Among the various publications which are protected
by the law of privilege . . . are those respecting public men and candidates 
for public office.”332 Based on that, it instructed, “[I]f the charges are based
upon some foundation in fact . . . and published in good faith, the
publication is privileged, even though it contains false imputations upon
the integrity of persons whose conduct is being considered.”333 
326. Id. at 289.
327. Id. at 290.
328. Not all courts agreed. See Eric M. Freedman, American Libel Law 1825-
1896: A Qualified Privilege for Public Affairs?, 30 CHITTY’S L.J. 113, 115 (1982)
(“Cases were decided each way, and it is difficult to judge which view was more
widely held.”).
329. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 679 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
330. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 679.
331. SAMUEL MERRILL, NEWSPAPER LIBEL: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRESS 3 
(1888).
332. Id. at 208.
333. Id.
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126 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
The actual-malice rule, then, did not break sharply from the common
law of libel. It is not true, as Gorsuch wrote in Berisha, that there was one
“accepted view” of libel for “two centuries” that allowed for the recovery
of damages in all cases concerning “false publications.”334 By the end of
the nineteenth century, the precursor to the actual-malice rule was already
a part of desk references for journalists. If anything, Sullivan was a product
of the common law, a constitutionalization of an increasingly important
doctrine meant to protect discussion about public officials. That is to say,
Sullivan’s rule was a natural extension of what came before it. As the
Handbook for the Press explained, the privilege was born of the very
structure of American government: “When the American colonies united
under a republican form of government, the writers for the press in this
country considered all restraints removed . . . .”335 Yet, again, for our
purposes it suffices to say, contrary to Thomas and Gorsuch, that Sullivan
does not “lack . . . historical support.”336 
V. PUBLIC-FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFFS
Even if there is historical support for putting additional burdens on
public officials, there is still the question of whether such burdens should
be placed on public figures, who, the argument would go, lie further from
the republican rationale for an actual-malice rule. The petition in Berisha
v. Lawson, after all, attacked not the actual-malice rule under Sullivan but
the rule as applied to public figures in cases like Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts. In Curtis Publishing Co., the Court did not attempt to base its
extension of the actual-malice rule on history, but rather common sense.
As Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote:
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between government
and private sectors are blurred. . . . In many situations, policy
determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal
political institutions are now originated and implemented through
a complex array of boards, committees, commissions,
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with
the Government. This blending of positions and power has also
occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold
public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions. . . . Our citizenry 
has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such
334. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
335. MERRILL, supra note 331, at 210.
336. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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1272021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as
it is in the case of ‘public officials.’337 
Yet, as with public officials, there is historical support for an extension
of the actual-malice rule to public figures that goes beyond this common
sense reasoning. In the common law doctrine of fair comment, for 
example, we see Warren’s very logic for extending the actual-malice rule.
As Martin Newell’s treatise explained, “Every person has a right to
comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he
does so fairly and with an honest purpose.”338 Traditionally, the doctrine 
was limited in several respects. It applied only to matters that “invite
public attention . . . never attack[] the individual, but only his work . . . 
never impute[] or insinuate[] dishonorable motives . . . [and] never take[]
advantage of the occasion to gratify private malice.”339 
The contexts in which fair comment was allowed, however, tell us
what early citizens understood to be topics of discussion that merited
additional protection. In these cases, the law spoke neither of public
officials nor public figures but rather public men and public conduct
generally.340 As one nineteenth century treatise said, “All political, legal
and ecclesiastical matters [were] matters of public concern.”341 Simply,
“[a]nything that is a public concern to the inhabitants is a matter of public
interest within the meaning of the rule.”342 The doctrine thus covered:
(1) “[m]atters concerning the administration of the government” and
(2) “[m]atters pertaining to the administration of public justice” but also 
those relating to (3) “the management of public institutions” like “colleges,
hospitals, [and] asylums”; (4) “appeals for public patronage,” like “artists,
public writers, [and] lecturers”; (5) “the character and quality of public
entertainments,” like “theatrical and musical performances”; and
(6) “religious bodies.”343 
In all of these matters, there was a common rationale: by moving into
the public eye, one acquiesced to its gaze. As the same treatise explained
in the context of public patronage, “[A] person [who] appeals to the public
by writing letters to the newspapers, either to expose what he deems abuses
337. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 160, 163–64 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
338. NEWELL, supra note 42, at 564.
339. Id. at 567.
340. Id. at 572.
341. Id. at 575.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 576–90.
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128 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
or to call attention to his own particular grievances . . . cannot complain if
he gets the worst of it.”344 Another example: if a “medical man brings 
forward some new method of treatment, and advertises it largely as the
best, . . . [h]e may be said to invite public attention.”345 In short,
“[w]hoever seeks notoriety or invites public attention is said to challenge
public criticism; and he cannot resort to the law courts if that criticism be
less favorable than he anticipated.”346 
While the doctrine of fair comment was, ostensibly, limited to matters
of opinion and did not extend to allegations against a public person’s
private character, in several nineteenth century cases, courts extended the
doctrine developed in early public-official cases to public figures to
protect even false statements of fact. In Press Co. v. Stewart, for example,
the plaintiff opened a typing school “profess[ing] to be a teacher of short-
hand writing, type-writing, and phono-scribing.”347 The offices he set up
were “alluringly placarded with signs, and various devices in the way of
circulars were scattered broadcast in the community calling attention to 
the merits of his system . . . .”348 When an editor’s attention was piqued by
the “extravagant nature” of the advertisements, he sent a reporter to the 
new business.349 
Reversing the lower court’s decision to uphold the jury’s verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned by
analogy to cases adopting privileges in the public-official context and held
that “a communication to be privileged must be made upon a proper
occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or
probable cause.”350 In such cases, malice would not be inferred. Instead, 
“[a]ctual malice must be proved before there can be a recovery.”351 
Realizing that it was extending the rule, the court said that it might be
“asked why this article is so privileged.”352 It was privileged not because
the plaintiff was a public official (he wasn’t), but “because it was proper
for public information.”353 The plaintiff “was holding himself out to the
world as a teacher and guide of youth [and] was seeking to attract them to
his place by signs, placards, and advertisements, some of them, at least, of
344. Id. at 583–84.
345. Id. at 584.
346. Id.
347. Press Co. v. Stewart, 14 A. 51, 52 (1888).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 53.
351. Id.
352. Id. (emphasis added).
353. Id.
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1292021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
an extraordinary nature.”354 As a result, “[t]his gave him a quasi public
character.”355 It made sense to require the plaintiff to prove actual malice,
because “[w]hether he was a proper person to instruct the young” was a
“matter[] of importance to the public, and the Press was in the strict line
of its duty when it sought such information, and gave it to the
public . . . .”356 The court added, “[I]f that information tended to show that
the plaintiff was a charlatan, and his system an imposture, the more need
that the public, and especially parents and guardians, should be informed
of it.”357 
Courts also extended this doctrine to titans of industry. In Crane v.
Waters, an 1882 case out of federal court in Massachusetts, the court found
that a newspaper article about a railroad baron was privileged as well.358 
There, the plaintiff alleged that the Boston Daily Advertiser had defamed
him by suggesting he would run a particular railroad into bankruptcy.359 
The defendants, however, argued that the topic of the railroads was
one in which the public has an interest, and that in discussing a
subject of that sort a public speaker or writer is not bound at his
peril to see that his statements are true, but has a qualified
privilege, as it has been called, in respect to such matters.360 
The court agreed, finding that when the topic of discussion was “the public
conduct and qualifications of a public man,” newspapers “are not held to
prove the exact truth of their statements . . . .”361 
In finding that the defendant could thus show that it published the 
statements believing them to be true even if they turned out to be false, the
court explained, “inasmuch as the project was one which affected a long
line of road, as yet only partly built, and the consolidation of several
companies, it assumes public importance.”362 It continued, “For this reason
the character of the plaintiff, as a constructor and manager of railroads,
seem to me to be open to public discussion when he comes forward with
so great and important a project affecting many interests besides those of





358. Crane v. Waters, 10 F. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 620.
361. Id. at 620–21.
362. Id. at 621.
363. Id. at 622.
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130 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
qualified privilege which attaches to discussions of public affairs.”364 In
so holding, it relied not on the doctrine of fair comment but, like the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Stewart, the analogy to cases adopting an
actual-malice defense.365 
In Struthers v. Peacock, an 1876 case, the plaintiff was an architect
who had contracted with the city to provide certain services.366 The
Philadelphia Bulletin alleged that the architect breached its contract with
the city by procuring subpar marble for public buildings.367 Instructing the 
jury, the judge spoke at length about what he called a “public journalists”
privilege.368 Having explained to the jury libel and malice, the judge
moved to the issue of “whether these articles . . . are [nevertheless]
deprived of malice by being what is called privileged communications,
and whether they are within the proper province of the defendants as
public journalists.”369 Noting that the defendants were “publishers of a
public journal,” he explained that it was “their right, and perhaps even their
duty, to call attention to and make comments upon the manner in which
the public buildings were being erected.”370 The defendants “were
probably doing the public a service in calling attention to the way the work
was being done,” and such discussion must “be exercised freely without
being subject to a too strict limitation.”371 
Importantly, this privilege applied even if the article at issue was false. 
As the judge said in Struthers, such articles do not lose their “privileged
character by going at times somewhat beyond the limit of strict truth, or
beyond what the writer may be able to prove.”372 But “[e]ditors are not
infallible any more than other men, and a fair margin must be allowed to
them for want of absolute accuracy, and for the necessities and the 
circumstances under which journalistic writing has to be done.”373 That is, 
some breathing space must be allowed for inquiries of the press into the
public affairs of others.
364. Id.
365. Id. (first citing State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34 (1837); then citing
Commonwealth. v. Morris, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 176 (1811); and then citing
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163 (1808)).
366. Struthers v. Peacock, 11 Phila. Rep. 287 (1876).
367. Id. at 290.
368. Id. at 290–93.
369. Id. at 292.
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1312021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Admittedly, as with cases involving public officials, the courts were
not unanimous in their protection of defendants who libeled public figures.
In Smith v. Tribune Co., an 1867 case, Gerrit Smith brought a libel lawsuit
against the Tribune Company for alleging that he faked lunacy in order to
avoid criminal charges stemming from his involvement in the raid at
Harper’s Ferry.374 In response, the Tribune argued that the libel was 
privileged because Smith “was a public man; that he professed to be a
teacher and educator of the public; that he had been in the habit of
delivering speeches and lectures from time to time, and made various
publications under his own name and of which he was the recognized
author . . . .”375 The court disagreed, noting that the allegations related not
to those matters but to feigning lunacy; his public conduct was
immaterial.376 
Still, we see evidence that public figures in Pennsylvania and
Massachusetts, as well as Vermont and Maine, including clergyman,
unelected but high-profile political bosses, and those contracting to
provide services to the government, were required to carry a heavier
burden as defamation plaintiffs than private figures were.377 But what
about celebrities? The absence of celebrities in these cases is likely
attributable to the idea of celebrity, as we understand it today, arriving only
in the last half of the nineteenth century with the likes of Sarah Bernhardt
and Oscar Wilde—who were friends and some of the most famous
individuals of the nineteenth century.378 Celebrity was in its infancy, and 
courts had not yet begun to grapple with the implications that would
follow.
Like Lewis v. Few before it, these cases demonstrate that since the 
mid-1800s, a plaintiff’s involvement in public affairs might affect her
burden in a libel case, even if she was not a public official. The idea being
that if her conduct affected public affairs, like a public official’s conduct
did, she should have to carry the same burden as that public official. True,
in extending the actual-malice rule to public officials in Curtis Publishing,
Co., the Supreme Court did not, as Thomas says, make “a sustained effort
to ground [its] holding[] in the Constitution’s original meaning”—it relied 
instead on the obvious influence that public figures had over matters of
374. Smith v. Trib. Co., 22 F. Cas. 689, 690 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1867) (No. 13,118).
375. Id. at 691.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385 (1878); Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt.
501, 511 (1879); Bearce v. Bass, 34 A. 411 (1896).
378. See generally Sharon Marcus, Salomé!! Sarah Bernhardt, Oscar Wilde,
and the Drama of Celebrity, 126 P.M.L.A. 999 (2011).
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132 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
public concern in the mid-twentieth century.379 But the fact that the Court
did not rely on history to support its finding does not mean that there is no
support in history for it. Thus, while Thomas is not wrong about his
characterizations of what the Court did in Curtis Publishing Co., he is
wrong in maintaining that the public-figure actual-malice rule “broke
sharply from the common law of libel . . . .”380 
VI. ERRONEOUS RELIANCE ON ENGLISH AUTHORITIES
In arguing against the actual-malice rule, Thomas and Gorsuch
eschewed this American history at the Founding and during the nineteenth
century in favor of an understanding of the English common law before
the Founding. In McKee, for example, Thomas cited Blackstone to 
demonstrate what a plaintiff traditionally had to prove to maintain a
defamation action, the allowed defenses, the existence of criminal libel 
laws, and that libels against public officials were treated more seriously
than other libels at common law.381 He echoed Justice Byron White, who
decades earlier said, “The men who wrote and adopted the First
Amendment were steeped in the common-law tradition of England.”382 
Those men “read Blackstone, ‘a classic tradition of the bar in the United
States’” and “learned that the major means of accomplishing his speech
and press was to prevent prior restraints . . . .”383 Gorsuch, too, relied on
Blackstone in his dissent in Berisha: “‘[E]very freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public’ but if he
publishes falsehoods ‘he must take the consequence of his own
temerity.’”384 It was this principle, he wrote, that “extended far back in the
common law and far forward into our Nation’s history.”385 
But one cannot read Blackstone in a historical vacuum. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone maintained that “[t]he 
liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications.”386 But that was hardly the only view of the liberty of the
press—especially in the United States. Founders like Thomas Jefferson
and James Wilson hated Blackstone. And while we focus on them in this
379. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 678 (2019).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 678–80.
382. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 381 n.14 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting).
383. Id.
384. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2426 (2021).
385. Id.
386. 4 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *151.
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1332021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
section, along with Blackstone’s editor in the United States, St. George
Tucker, they were not alone. As James Madison wrote in the Report of
1800, the Blackstonian idea that freedom of press means freedom from
previous restraints “can never be admitted to be the American idea of it:
since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications, would have a
similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them.”387 
Additionally, recent exhaustive scholarship has dispelled the prior
consensus that Blackstone’s view of freedom of the press was the
prevailing one in the early United States.388 
While Thomas and Gorsuch invoked Blackstone, neither inquired into
whether his view of the freedom of the press was shared by the Founders.
There is, after all, a difference between an awareness or even an
admiration of an author and agreement with an author. This is especially
true where Blackstone’s Commentaries attempted to summarize the entire 
body of the English common law. For exactly that reason, Thomas has
recognized that Blackstone should not always be seen as controlling. As
he wrote in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, we need not rely on Blackstone
if the law he summarized “had been a significant complaint of the
American Revolution” and where the American experience “confirmed” a
contrary precedent.389 Applying this test, this Part asks whether reliance
on Blackstone in the context of libel and freedom of the press should be
considered authoritative.
In short, freedom of the press was a significant complaint of the
Revolution. Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. wrote in Prelude to Independence
that in the run up to the Revolution, “[b]ristling controversial articles . . . 
signaled the change and inevitably brought the patriot prints into head-on 
collision with the English common law of seditious libel.”390 As we have 
already seen, American experience confirmed contrary precedent to that
of England—especially when it came to their rejection of common law
rules meant to protect public debate.391 Even the Sedition Act, after all,
allowed for truth as a defense to a seditious libel charge, unlike in England.
As Judge Kent explained, unlike the English, “the people of this country
387. JAMES MADISON, THE REPORT OF 1800 (1800).
388. See, e.g., WENDELL BIRD, THE REVOLUTION IN FREEDOMS OF PRESS AND
SPEECH: FROM BLACKSTONE TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FOX’S LIBEL ACT
(2020); WENDELL BIRD, CRIMINAL DISSENT: PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION ACTS OF 1798 (2020).
389. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2038 (2020) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
390. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER SR., PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE: THE 
NEWSPAPER WAR ON BRITAIN viii (1st ed. 1957).
391. See supra Parts I–II.
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134 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
have always classed the freedom of the press among their fundamental
rights.”392 Thus, reliance on Blackstone, who Jefferson said did “more 
towards the suppression of the liberties of man, than all the million[s] of
men in arms of Bonaparte,” is misplaced.393 
A. The Founders Rejected Reliance on Blackstone
Blackstone, born in 1723, was “stiff, stuffy, and pompous from
childhood . . . .”394 He was also a failure. He was a middling lawyer, 
thwarted in his academic aspirations and, early on, deemed unfit for
professorship.395 As a judge, “his rulings . . . were set aside more 
frequently than those of any other . . . .”396 But above everything, he was 
persistent, prolific, and good at writing.397 In 1753, still not a professor,
Blackstone started informally lecturing students on the common law.
Having been passed over for a professorship in the Roman civil law, he
set out to make sense of the “huge, irregular Pile” that was the common
law.398 After five years, Oxford formalized his instruction, naming him the 
first professor of common law.399 
Inspired by his own success, by 1765, Blackstone published his first
volume of the Commentaries (on the rights of persons), closely tracking 
his lectures. He published the second (on the rights of things) in 1766, the
third (of private wrongs) in 1768, and the fourth (of public wrongs) in
1769. By the time he finished the fourth volume, he had published a third
edition of volumes one and two.400 Before the time the first American
edition appeared around 1771–1772, a thousand copies of his
392. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
393. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814), in 
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-07-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/7AGR-7ULX].
394. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1996).
395. Martin Jordan Minot, Note, The Irrelevance of Blackstone: Rethinking
the Eighteenth-Century Importance of the Commentaries, 104 VA. L. REV. 1359,
1370 (2018).
396. Alschuler, supra note 394, at 15.
397. Joseph W. McKnight, Blackstone, Quasi-Jurisprudent, 13 S.W. L.J. 399,
400 (1959).
398. Letter from William Blackstone to the Earl of Reading, 32 HARV. L. REV. 
974, 976 (1919).
399. Alschuler, supra note 394, at 4.
400. John V. Orth, “Catch a Falling Star”: The Bluebook and Citing
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 125 (2020).
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1352021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Commentaries had circulated in the Colonies.401 The earliest American
edition introduced an additional 1,500 copies, with more than half sent to
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. Copies found their way into
the hands of future President John Adams, future Supreme Court Justice
James Wilson, and future Chief Justice John Marshall.402 
Even if we accept that the Founders were familiar with Blackstone and
his Commentaries at the time of the Founding, that familiarity should not
be confused with endorsement.403 Blackstone was a rabid Tory and no 
friend to the Founders’ cause.404 As a member of Parliament, he voted in
favor and was a chief defender of the Stamp Act.405 He denied “that
Americans could appeal to the common law in defense of their
rights . . . .”406 He declared the Colonies “a conquered territory and thus
subject to Parliament’s authority.”407 And he believed that ultimate
sovereignty resided in Parliament, not the People. So of course “lawyers
of the founding generation . . . subjected Blackstone’s work to sharp
criticism.”408 These lawyers were devoted to making “their own law.”409 
1. Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone
Thomas Jefferson’s disagreement with Blackstone began as early as
1776. After the Revolution, Jefferson demanded that the then-existing
colonial Virginia laws be repealed and “adapted to our republican form of
government.”410 A compatriot suggested that they adopt Blackstone and
401. Minot, supra note 395, at 1362; Alschuler, supra note 394, at 5.
402. Minot, supra note 395, at 1374; PAUL HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
COLONIAL NEW YORK 65 (1939).
403. There is reason to doubt the wide acceptance of Blackstone at the time of
the Founding. Minot, supra note 395, at 1398 (“While they may have read the
work and viewed it favorably, the full force of the Commentaries’ influence would
not be felt until subsequent generations [after the Founding].”).
404. Alschuler, supra note 394, at 9.
405. Howard L. Lubert, Sovereignty and Liberty in William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 72 REV. POL. 271 (2010).
406. Id. at 272.
407. Id. (citation omitted).
408. Alschuler, supra note 394, at 2.
409. Id.
410. THOMAS JEFFERSON, PAUL FORD & MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743–1790, at 66 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1914).
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136 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
purge “what was inapplicable, or unsuitable to us.”411 But Jefferson 
disagreed because the end product would retain the “same chaos of law-
lore from which we wished to be emancipated.”412 
While Jefferson won that battle, he did not stem Blackstone’s
acceptance in the young country—though he never stopped trying. For
years, “Jefferson derided the Commentaries as dangerous for its . . . over-
simplified view of law . . . .”413 But more importantly, in Blackstone,
Jefferson saw “a retreat from the ideals of the Revolution.”414 By 1810, he 
lamented that young lawyers seemed to believe “that every thing which is
necessary is in [Blackstone], [and] what is not in him is not necessary.”415 
A year later, he wrote that the country had been filled with “Blackstone
lawyers . . . who render neither honor nor service to mankind.”416 In 1812, 
he wrote that a student’s “indolence easily persuades him that if he
understands that book, he is a master of the whole body of the law.”417 In
an 1814 letter, he said that the Commentaries had caused “the general
defection of lawyers and judges from the free principles of
government.”418 That same year, he wrote that Blackstone was “making
tories of those young Americans whose native feelings of independance
do not place them above [Blackstone’s] wily sophistries . . . .”419 
Jefferson did not fear the loss of liberty from force. But he feared
“English books, English prejudices, English manners,” all of which
411. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (June 17, 1812), in Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-
05-02-0112 [https://perma.cc/R22Y-CTWX].
412. Id. (emphasis added).
413. Minot, supra note 395, at 1366.
414. Id. at 1397.
415. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (May 26, 1810), in Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-
02-02-0365 [https://perma.cc/YK9Z-33ZK].
416. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Rives (Sept. 18, 1811), in
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-04-02-0143 [https://perma.cc/4T7P-UT2R].
417. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler (June 17, 1812), in Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-
05-02-0112 [https://perma.cc/7JC6-9R5P].
418. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Jan. 16, 1814), in 
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-07-02-0071 [https://perma.cc/D74A-YDHD].
419. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio G. Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814), in 
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-07-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/FLN9-2JS4].
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1372021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
undercut “the principles which severed us from England.”420 Months
before his death, he wrote to James Madison about plans for the
appointment of a law professor at the University of Virginia, where he
served as rector: “In selecting of our Law-Professor, we must be rigorously
attentive to his political principles.”421 Pointing to Sir Edward Coke, he
said, “a sounder whig never wrote.”422 But when 
the honied . . . Blackstone became the Student’s Hornbook[,] from
that moment that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began
to slide into toryism, and nearly all the young brood of lawyers
now are of that hue. They suppose themselves, to be whigs,
because they no longer know what whiggism or republicanism
means.423 
Unsurprisingly then, Jefferson did not ascribe to Blackstone’s limited
view of freedom of the press either. Take first Jefferson’s transatlantic
input on the Bill of Rights. Madison had, in June 1789, proposed to the
House a list of amendments that would eventually become the Bill of
Rights. One provided, “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments . . . .”424 After 
Madison sent a copy to Jefferson in France, Jefferson wrote back
suggesting several modifications (in italic). One related to the freedom of
the press:
I like it as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further.
For instance the following alterations and additions would have
pleased me. Art 4. “The people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write or otherwise to publish any thing 
but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or
reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with
420. Id.
421. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), in




424. James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (1789) (partial
transcript available at https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states
/interactives/bill-of-rights/speech/enlarge3-transcribe.html [https://perma.cc/Q27
Z-ZMR7]).
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138 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
foreign nations.425 
Although Madison’s proposal was general in nature, Jefferson’s was a
specific rejection of the common law of libel and Blackstone’s
understanding of it. That specificity reveals Jefferson’s more liberal view
of freedom of the press. While Blackstone limited liberty of the press to
freedom from prior restraint alone, Jefferson would have gone further and
protected true speech from punishment after publication—and he would
have done so as early as the 1780s. 
Jefferson’s fight against the Sedition Act of 1798 confirms his
rejection of Blackstone’s views of freedom of the press. In drafting the
Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson argued that the Act was unconstitutional, 
even though it nominally provided truth as a defense, which was itself
more liberal than Blackstone’s views and, on its face, consistent with
Jefferson’s view of the First Amendment. Controversy over the Act boiled
down to whether Blackstone’s understanding of freedom of press should
be accepted. Federalist supporters in Congress argued that the Act was not
a prior restraint and thus not an infringement on the liberty of the press
under Blackstone. Jefferson’s supporters, however, disagreed, arguing that
freedom of the press in the United States meant something more than
Blackstone’s definition of it at common law.
For example, Virginia Representative John Nicholas, rising in
opposition to the Act, argued, “[I]t is a manifest abuse of Blackstone’s
authority to apply it as it has been here applied [in defending the Act].”426 
As Nicholas said, “It must be remarked, in [Blackstone’s defense], that the
nature of their government justifies more rigor than is consistent with
ours. . . . [H]is observations on this subject ought to be called a theory, and
a theory adapted merely to his own country, and not a definition.”427 But:
Very different are the circumstances in which his doctrine has
been applied here. A restrictive clause of the Constitution of the
United States [i.e., the First Amendment], by its application, is
made to mean nothing, and when it is clearly the intention of the
Constitution to put, at least, some acts of the press out of the 
control of Congress, by the authority of [Blackstone] all are
425. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-15-02-0354 [https://perma.cc/BC4Z-W6J2] (second emphasis added).
426. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 3009 (1851).
427. Id.
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1392021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
subjected to their power.428 
Democratic-Republicans like Nicholas lost that fight. They were
outnumbered by their Federalist rivals in Congress who supported the
Sedition Act in hopes of securing a second term for John Adams. Yet after
Jefferson won that election, the Act expired on its own terms in 1801, and
Jefferson pardoned those convicted under it: “I considered & now
consider, that law to be a nullity as absolute and as palpable as if Congress
had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.”429 While the
Supreme Court never had the opportunity to assess the Act’s
constitutionality, it declared some 150 years later, “Although the Sedition
Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried
the day in the court of history.”430 
2. St. George Tucker and Blackstone
By the time St. George Tucker, a Revolutionary War veteran and “the
first modern American law professor,” received a letter from Jefferson in
1793, he was already annotating Blackstone for Americans.431 Without
time to devise his own text before his first class after his appointment to
professor, he turned instead to repackaging the Commentaries “and
occasionally to offer remarks upon such passages . . . either because the
law had been confirmed, or changed, or repealed, by some constitutional
or legislative act of the Federal Government, or,” in the case of his
students, “of the commonwealth of Virginia.”432 
In the end, Tucker’s American edition of the Commentaries was the
first “uniquely American” commentary.433 His 800 pages of annotations
and 1,000 footnotes was not a memorial to Blackstone but “an engagement
of it in combat.”434 Tucker was “troubled not so much by the content of
428. Id. 
429. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Smith Adams (July 22, 1804),
in Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Adams/99-03-02-1294 [https://perma.cc/5TD7-K89E].
430. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
431. David T. Hardy, Colloquy Essays: The Lecture Notes of St. George
Tucker: A Framing Era View of the Bill of Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1527 (2009)
(citing Craig Evan Klafter, St. George Tucker: The First Modern American Law
Professor, 6 J. HIST. SOC. 133 (2006)); Alschuler, supra note 394, at 11.
432. 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at vi.
433. Robert M. Cover, Blackstone’s Commentaries with Notes of Reference to
the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (1970).
434. Id. at 1477.
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140 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
the Commentaries,” but “by its jurisprudence and political philosophy.”435 
The Revolution was “justified by the repudiation of two basic British
tenets: first, the rejection of British views concerning the nature and locus
of sovereignty; second, the rejection of the British Constitution as a near-
perfect, or even a relatively good, embodiment of political philosophy.”436 
Although “Blackstone did not create . . . the British orthodoxy of the
eighteenth century,” “he did embody” it.437 An American Commentaries 
was thus vital, because Americans had shed that orthodoxy through
Revolution. The Colonies’ independence “produced a corresponding
revolution not only in the principles of our government, but in the laws”— 
which, as a result, became “irreconcileable to the principles contained in 
the Commentaries.”438 
The simplicity of the observation masks its persuasive force. Of
course, the Commentaries established under one system of government
should not control the meaning of a law under an entirely different kind of
government. But this was exactly the battle Tucker had to wage. In 
Tucker’s view, from the Revolution onward, the Commentaries became 
less important as the United States and the United Kingdom continued
their divergence. Instead, they became only “a methodical guide, in
delineating the general outlines of the law in the United States, or at most,
in apprizing the student of what the law had been.”439 
As to freedom of the press, Tucker wrote that while the English had
acquiesced to the mere absence of licensing laws as the defining
characteristic of their freedom of the press, “the people of America have
not thought proper to suffer the freedom of speech, and of the press to rest
upon such an uncertain foundation, as the will and pleasure of the
government.”440 Those early Americans positively ratified a constitutional
amendment protecting speech and the press. Rather than rely on the
absence of laws infringing speech and press as in England, Americans
declared that such laws are unconstitutional. That amendment stood,
Tucker said, as a “barrier against the possible encroachments of the
government.”441 This principle could not have been more “strenuously 
asserted.”442 
435. Id.
436. Id. at 1477–78.
437. Id. at 1478.
438. 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at iv–v (emphasis added).
439. Id. at v.
440. Id. at app. at 12.
441. Id. at 13.
442. Id.
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1412021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Tucker wrote that the Sedition Act “excited more apprehension, and
greater indignation in many parts of the U. States . . . than any other
measure of the federal government.”443 It was “supposed by many to
amount to a most flagrant violation of the constitution.”444 But, Tucker
wrote: 
[T]his exposition of the liberty of the press, was only to be found
in the theoretical writings of the commentators on the English
government, where the liberty of the press rests upon no other
ground, than that there is now no law which imposes any actual
previous restraint upon the press . . . .445 
The English government, however, was much different than that
prevailing in the United States, and thus claims about freedom of the press
were necessarily different as well:
[I]n the United States, the great and essential rights of the people,
are secured against legislative, as well as against executive
ambition. They are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative;
but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the
freedom of the press requires, that it should be exempt, not only
from previous restraint by the executive, as in Great-Britain; but
from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual,
must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of
licencers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws. . . .
[T]he practice in America must be entitled to much more respect:
being in most instances founded upon the express declarations
contained in the respective constitutions, or bill of rights of the
confederated states. That even in those states where no such
guarantee could be found, the press had always exerted a freedom
in canvassing the merits, and measures of public men of every
description, not confined to the limits of common law.446 
Thus, Tucker’s writing shows us that early Americans believed there
was a difference between freedom of the press in England and freedom of
the press in the United States. The reason for the difference was clear and
echoed early cases on the subject: the republican government established
after the Revolution required a broader understanding of freedom of the
press to make that government work. Without that latitude, it would be too
443. TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42.
444. Id.
445. TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at app. at 18.
446. Id. at 20–21.
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142 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
easy for powerful political actors to weaponize libel law for political
battles against opponents. But with it, public discussion about public
affairs could occur without the overwhelming fear that participation in a
republican government might end in criminal or civil liability.
3. James Wilson and Blackstone
James Wilson was one of the few Founders who signed both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and he had more of an
effect on the latter than anyone but Madison.447 Like Jefferson, he viewed
Blackstone as a “great supporter” of “systematic despotism.”448 Wilson 
wanted to replace Blackstone and his Tory ideals and become his
American equivalent.449 He never succeeded. That distinction is more
rightly Tucker’s. But in 1790, Wilson delivered a series of lectures much
like Blackstone had before him.450 For his first lecture, Wilson stood
before students but also the “President of the United States, with his
lady—also the Vice-President, and both houses of Congress.”451 
Invoking Blackstone’s professorship at Oxford, Wilson posed a
question, “Should the elements of a law education . . . be drawn entirely
from another country—or should they be drawn, in part, at least, from the
constitutions and governments and laws of the United States, and of the
several States composing the Union?”452 Put differently, should we be 
educating British lawyers or American ones? He argued for the latter, for
an education based on a government where “the supreme or sovereign
power . . . resides in the citizens.”453 Ever the revolutionary, he explained
that this sovereignty was embodied in the “constitutions and governments
and laws of the United States, and the republics, of which they are
447. Mark David Hall, Notes and Documents: James Wilson’s Law Lectures, 
128 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 63, 64 (2004).
448. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 458 (1793).
449. Mark David Hall, Bibliographical Essay: The History of James Wilson’s
Law Lectures, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., 2007).
450. 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON xx (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., 2007).
451. Letter from John Adams to Charles Adams n.2 (Dec. 4, 1790), in
Founders Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Adams/04-09-02-0079 [https://perma.cc/HFQ9-UF97].
452. 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 13–14 (James Dewitt 
Andres ed., 1896).
453. Id. at 14.
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1432021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
formed”—all of which were “materially different” and “materially better” 
than that in England.454 
Blackstone’s view of the law of England, then, “deserves to be much
admired; but []ought not to be implicitly followed” in the United States.455 
Blackstone, through no fault of his own, was an intellectual captive of the
English theory of things—an un-American theory—and, thus, far from “a 
zealous friend of republicanism.”456 The only experiment in republicanism
from which Blackstone could draw was England’s disastrous one under
Oliver Cromwell. So it made sense that Blackstone would “feel a degree
of aversion, latent, yet strong, to a republican government.”457 And having
grown up under one government, it was not surprising that that
government “might steal imperceptibly upon [Blackstone’s] mind” and
influence him in thinking that a republic is “its rival, and . . . enemy.”458 
Wilson took this view of Blackstone to the bench of the Supreme
Court. In 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia, he wrote that Blackstone’s views
on the unchecked power of the king were an “extensive principle, on which
a plan of systematic despotism has been lately formed in England.”459 
Blackstone, he said, was “if not the introducer, at least the great supporter”
of this despotism.460 Rejecting the “principle . . . that all human law must
be prescribed by a superior,” Wilson said the law in the United States was
much different: “[L]aws derived from the pure source of equality and
justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they 
require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in the
man.”461 
Still, it might be argued that Wilson essentially ratified Blackstone’s
views on freedom of the press. In debates over the proposed constitution
in the Pennsylvania convention, Wilson said:
I presume it was not in the view of the honorable gentleman to say
there is no such thing as a libel, or that the writers of such ought
not to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the press is not
carried so far as this in any country. What is meant by the liberty
of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon
454. Id.
455. Id. at 20.
456. Id. at 19.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 20.
459. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 458 (1793).
460. Id. 
461. Id.
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144 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
it . . . .462 
We can excuse Wilson’s adoption of the Blackstonian definition of
freedom of press, though. In that moment, he stood before opponents of
the proposed constitution that was almost as much his as it was Madison’s.
Those opponents pressed him on why the new proposal did not contain a
protection for the liberty of the press, and Wilson needed to parry those
attacks.
Within a few years after he secured support for his constitution,
however, he rejected the central tenants of libel law according to the Star
Chamber, as restated by Blackstone. The first, that libels against public
officials are necessarily worse than other libels. The second, the same one
challenged by Jefferson: that truth, like falsity, could also be punished as 
libel. In his Lectures on Law, Wilson indicted the Star Chamber for
“wrest[ing] the law of libels to the purposes of [public] ministers.”463 The
first rule of law of the Star Chamber had been that “a libel against a
magistrate, or other publick person, is a greater offence than one against a
private man.”464 But, Wilson said, “This, in the unqualified manner here
expressed, cannot be rationally admitted.”465 Instead, in this country,
“[o]ther circumstances being equal, that of office ought to incline the
beam, if the libel refer to his official character or conduct.”466 
B. The Founders Rejected English Statutes Favoring Public Officials
In addition to Blackstone, Justice Thomas also resorted to ancient
authorities from England to support his view that the common law of libel
treated libels against public officials more severely than others. While this
may have been true in medieval England, the weakness in Thomas’s
argument is that he ignored the very thing that he said matters: the state of
the law in England at the time of the Founding. When we examine this
authority at that time, we discover that even the English had distanced
themselves from these medieval statutes. Contrary to Thomas’s argument,
these ancient statutes actually support an argument that by the time of the 
Founding, no longer did the common law treat public-official plaintiffs
different from any other plaintiff.
462. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 3.




466. Id. at 73–74 (emphasis added).
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1452021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
The chief authority for Thomas’s views on this point is tucked away
in a footnote in his opinion in McKee. There, Thomas wrote, “In England,
‘[w]ords spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of
the realm’ were called scandalum magnatum and were ‘held to be still
more heinous.’”467 According to him, “such words could support a claim
that ‘would not be actionable in the case of a common person.’”468 
Scandalum magnatum was “recognized by English statutes dating back to
1275,” but “had fallen into disuse by the 19th century and was not
employed in the United States.”469 But Thomas maintained, “[T]he action
of scandalum magnatum confirms that the law of defamation historically
did not impose a heightened burden on public figures as plaintiffs.”470 
What is not found in that footnote is the specifics about scandalum
magnatum’s long history, from its birth under Edward Longshanks to its 
eventual repeal. Scandalum magnatum is really three statutes—one from
1275 (more than 200 years before the arrival of the printing press in
England), one from 1378, and one from 1388—all adopted centuries
before the Glorious Revolution.471 These statutes were set down during the 
reigns of kings either attempting to consolidate their power (Edward I) or
trying desperately to maintain it (Richard II).472 For example, the original
statute read, “[N]one be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or tales,
whereby discord, or occasion of discord, or slander, may grow between
the king and his people or the great men of the realm.”473 
Under the statutes, certain words that were otherwise not actionable as
defamation at common law were subject to criminal prosecution if made
against public officials like “prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other
nobles and great men of the realm.”474 That is, the statutes protected the
Crown from criticism by doling out punishment on its behalf, and “set the
peerage apart from the rest of English society.”475 While the statutes were
meant to promote peaceful resolutions to disputes, they were nevertheless
barbaric. Once Queen Elizabeth I, desiring that a critic be hanged, instead




471. WILLIAM DAVID EVANS, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES CONNECTED WITH
THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW 201–202 (1836).
472. FOLKARD, supra note 42, at 218.
473. Id. (emphasis not included).
474. Id.
475. Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294, 296 (1872); John C. Lassiter, Defamation
of the Peers: The Rise and Decline of the Action for Scandalum Magnatum, 22 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 216, 216 (1978).
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146 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
“had to be satisfied with having one of the man’s hands removed.”476 
Others would lose their ears.477 
Up to this point, Thomas is correct that scandalum magnatum did treat 
the peerage differently than private individuals; it applied only to the
former, but not the latter. But that is only part of the story. Although the
oldest of the statutes dates to 1275, they were rarely used early on. Despite
the peerage’s desire to wield scandalum magnatum to protect their
positions of power, “from the start the courts were determined to prevent
the abuse of the law by peers.”478 Criminal prosecutions were not often 
pursued, and the first recorded civil action did not take place until 1497.479 
But there was no rash of cases after that. Active enforcement of the statutes
did not exist for nearly another hundred years beginning in 1580 until the 
Restoration in 1660—and even then, the number of reported cases was a
mere 18.480 
True, after the Restoration, the peerage’s defensiveness in maintaining
its privileges revived scandalum magnatum “as a reminder to their
inferiors that the old order truly had been restored.”481 But the peerage was
too bold in their use of the statutes.482 Courts began to recognize that the 
peerage used the “special protection they enjoyed from abusive
language . . . [to] serve political as well as purely personal social ends.”483 
As England spun out of control politically from the exclusion crisis aimed
at preventing the Catholic James, Duke of York, from taking the throne,
so did actions under the statutes.484 In response, the House of Commons in 
1680 attempted to repeal the statutes, although it is unclear if the
motivation was in direct response to the abuse of them.485 The Lords, 
however, rejected the attempt—not keen, apparently, on giving up their
privileges.486 
Around that time, the future King James II, then the Duke of York,
wielded the statutes to suppress political opposition.487 He filed no fewer
476. Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and
the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 671 (1984).
477. F.R. Scott, Publishing False News, 30 CAN. BAR REV. 37 (1952).
478. Lassiter, supra note 475, at 218.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 219–20.
481. Id. at 223–24.
482. Id. at 225.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 226.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 229.
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1472021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
than 10 cases against his opponents for outlandish sums of money.488 Sir
Francis Drake, a defendant in one, disposed of his estate and sailed to 
another country, “thinking it better to have his liberty in a foreign country
than be laid up in his own for £100,000.”489 And while these cases were 
part of a spike in the abuse of the statutes, they were viewed as
“reflect[ing] the growing political disorders which England experienced in
the last ten years of the reign of Charles II” rather than a doctrinal shift in
the law.490 
By the time James II ascended to the throne, the statutes “were used
much less frequently.”491 James II’s use of the statutes had coupled 
scandalum magnatum “to the Stuart cause.”492 And like James II, they
“had become too closely identified with him to survive his downfall
[during the Glorious Revolution] unchallenged.”493 After he was deposed,
the House of Commons sought to reverse judgments in two cases under
the statutes in 1689 and 1690.494 
By the time King George I rose to the throne, “most peers were content
to live without the protection of the statutes,” and the House of Lords
offered to repeal scandalum magnatum altogether.495 By 1703, “in the eyes
of the law, a man’s . . . claim to knightly or noble status . . . was now less
and less an acceptable criterion for determining whether he was entitled to
damages . . . .”496 According to one historian, while a “thin stream of cases
can be traced through the eighteenth century,” the last recorded case took
place in 1773, three years before the Revolution and almost 20 years 
before the First Amendment would be ratified.497 
Although Parliament would not repeal scandalum magnatum until
1887, it was, for all practical purposes, dead letter before the founding of
the country.498 Scholars have martialed a bevy of fatal descriptors: “now 
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 225.




495. Id. at 232–33.
496. Id. at 234 (“the nobility preferr[ed] to waive their privileges in any action
of slander, and to stand upon the same footing, with respect to civil remedies, as 
their fellow-subjects.” (quoting 1 WILLIAM O. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS 326 (1824)).
497. Id. at 233, 235.
498. Statute Law Revision Act 1887, 50 & 51 Vict. c. 59 (Eng.); W. BLAKE 
ODGERS, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 74 (5th ed. 1912).
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148 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
in a manner forgotten,”499 “by lapse of time . . . become unnecessary,”500 
“obsolete,”501 “long been obsolete,”502 et cetera.503 As one noted, 
“[t]hough they survived until 1887, the statutes of scandalum magnatum
belong essentially to that age which accepted ‘degree, priority and place’
(to use Shakespeare’s phrase) as the unquestionable stamp of God’s
creation.”504 
In the early United States, to the extent they were remembered at all,
the statutes were remembered as evidence of the Crown’s prior abuses and
as repugnant to the new republican form of government created by the
Founders. In that government, unlike that in which scandalum magnatum
first became law, it was the People who were sovereign, not a king.
Scandalum magnatum, after all, was adopted to protect the sovereign
Crown from its subjects. It was meant to quash republican sentiment, not
cultivate it. Scandalum magnatum then “ha[d] all the crudities of that
savage era of monarchical autocracy in which it had its birth, still clinging
to it.”505 As one commentator explained, the statutes’ “significance was in
their anti-democratic tendencies.”506 
Thus, scandalum magnatum was abandoned in early America. In
Maryland, the “antient statutes . . . of scandalum magnatum” did not
“extend[] to the province.”507 In Virginia, a leading commentator in the
1830s wrote, “[T]his offense is not recognized by our laws.”508 Early
courts were in agreement. In 1872, the Illinois Supreme Court explained
499. 3 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 474 (1844).
500. William Renwick Riddell, Scandalum Magnatum in Upper Canada, 4 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 12, 14 (1914).
501. ODGERS, supra note 498, at 74; see also HENRY C. ADAMS, A JURIDICAL
GLOSSARY 603 (1886) (noting that the statutes were “now obsolete”).
502. See SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 410 (3d ed.
1922).
503. FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 178 (1818); see also
RICHARD MENCE, THE LAW OF LIBEL 84 (1824).
504. Lassiter, supra note 475, at 235.
505. A.H. Robbins, Note, The Action of the Government Against the New York
World as a Revival of the Offense of Scandalum Magnatum, 68 CENT. L.J. 135,
135–36 (1909).
506. Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel 
in American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 446 (2004).
507. WILLIAM KILTY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS 
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND 
4–5 (1811).
508. 2 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 58.
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1492021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
that scandalum magnatum was “never recognized in this country.”509 The 
North Carolina Supreme Court said in 1887, “[I]n this day and country 
there is no such thing as ‘scandalum magnatum . . . .’”510 In 1890, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed, finding that the doctrine of
scandalum magnatum “has never been adopted in Massachusetts.”511 The 
Eighth Circuit said it best when it said that scandalum magnatum was 
“once the law,” but “[a] revolution intervened.”512 
Even the treatises on which Thomas relied—Starkie and Newell— 
make clear that scandalum magnatum was not adopted in the States. 
Instead, it was outright rejected.513 Newell rejected the idea that public
officials were to be treated more leniently than private persons:
In practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at
whom any person may let fly his poisonous words. High official
position instead of affording immunity from slanderous and
libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his
character free plunder for any one who desires to create a
sensation by attacking it.514 
Newell’s position was the same as Starkie’s before him: “In this country
no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice, a person holding
a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his
poisonous words.”515 
In the end, as one early-twentieth-century law journal concluded, “the
old common law offense of scandalum magnatum was left behind when 
our fathers planted the principles of civil liberty and equality.”516 
Scandalum magnatum had thus given way, in that journal’s estimation, “to
the rule . . . that there can be no libel of the government or of government
officials as such.”517 And no longer was it any “greater wrong to falsely
criticise the government than it is to speak evil of a private citizen.”518 The 
law had long since rejected “Anglo-Saxon barbarism [that] affirmed the
509. Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294, 296 (1872).
510. Reeves v. Winn, 1 S.E. 448, 450 (N.C. 1887).
511. Sillars v. Collier, 23 N.E. 723, 724 (Mass. 1890).
512. Casey v. City of Cabool, Mo., 12 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1993).
513. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 682 n.2 (2019); see, e.g., KILTY, supra 
note 507, at 45; 2 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42.
514. NEWELL, supra note 42, at 201.
515. FOLKARD, supra note 42, at 217 n.1.
516. Robbins, supra note 505, at 136.
517. Id.
518. Id.
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150 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
contrary and the old Tower of London [that] witnessed the suffering of
men who dared to raise their voices against the king.”519 
The freedom of the press that Thomas and Gorsuch espouse is not an
originalist one; it is a monarchist’s one, predating the Founding and
purporting to import into the First Amendment today common law rules 
long ago rejected by the Founders and early courts. This approach,
however, violates Thomas’s own instruction that what matters for the
purposes of an originalist inquiry is the “founding era understanding.”520 
Indeed, Thomas’s view ignores that there was a Revolution, and that no
small complaint of that Revolution was England’s abuses of prosecutions
of early American printers. It also ignores everything that happened
between 1789 and 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment made the First
Amendment applicable as against the States. Thomas’s failure to deal with
this history draws into question his supposed commitment to it.
VII. OTHER PROBLEMS
Thus far, this Article has focused on the big picture issues: Was there
an American understanding of freedom of the press and libel different from
that of the English? And if there was, what were their differences? This
Article has argued that there was a difference. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the Founders, legislatures, and courts adapted the
common law of libel to a republican form of government. This resulted in
differences in how the law treated public officials and public figures as
opposed to private figures, but not in the way Thomas and Gorsuch argue.
This Part cleans up some of the remaining issues.
First, we address one of the remaining historical arguments offered by
both Thomas and Gorsuch. In McKee, Thomas argued that before Sullivan,
the Court “consistently recognized that the First Amendment did not
displace the common law of libel.”521 The Court, he wrote, repeatedly
placed libel into the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.”522 Put differently, “We did not begin
meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175 years after the First
Amendment was ratified.”523 Gorsuch adopted Thomas’s position in
519. Id.
520. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
521. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
522. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942)).
523. Id. at 682.
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1512021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
Berisha as well, writing that “from the very founding,” the law of
defamation was “almost exclusively the business of state courts and
legislatures.”524 
The claim that the Court did not “begin meddling” until 1964 is not
accurate. In 1907, in Patterson v. Colorado, a publisher argued that the
contempt conviction for a libel on the Colorado Supreme Court violated
his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.525 Affirming the
lower courts, Justice Holmes did not trouble himself with the First
Amendment. Rather, he merely assumed it:
We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in
the [Fourteenth] Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the
[First]. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part
not only of the United States but also of the states, still we should
be far from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us
reach. In the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional
provisions is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practised by other governments,’ and 
they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare. 526 
Justice Harlan, however, disagreed. As far as he saw it, “[I]t would
seem clear that, when the [Fourteenth] Amendment prohibited the states 
from impairing or abridging the privileges of citizens of the United States,
it necessarily prohibited the states from impairing or abridging the
constitutional rights of such citizens to free speech and a free press.”527 He
would go further and recognize that:
the privileges of free speech and of a free press, belonging to every
citizen of the United States, constitute essential parts of every
man’s liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any
person of his liberty without due process of law.528 
524. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2426 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369–70 (1974)).
525. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 458–59 (1907).
526. Id. at 462.
527. Id. at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
528. Id. at 465.
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152 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Turning to the merits, Harlan noted that in that case, the Court adopted in
dicta Blackstone’s view of the First Amendment.529 Harlan, though, could
not “assent to that view.”530 Instead, because the First Amendment was 
applicable to the States, those States could not through “legislative
enactments or by judicial action, impair or abridge them.”531 Thus, the
contempt finding, he believed, “was in violation of the rights of free
speech and a free press as guaranteed by the Constitution.”532 
Years later, after the Court finally found that freedom of the press was
incorporated as against the States, the Court in 1940 took a case to answer
the question of whether the First Amendment had any effect on the
common law of libel.533 In that case, Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v.
Sweeney, the publisher posed precisely the conflict that Thomas asserts
had never been thought of prior to Sullivan: “These guarantees [under the 
First Amendment] bespeak more than a prohibition of ‘previous
restraints’; a statute imposing subsequent punishment which has the effect
of trammelling or embarrassing unduly the expression of views on matters
of public interest is likewise unconstitutional.”534 The publisher argued, “it
can make no constitutional difference that the penalty in question is
imposed through processes denominated civil rather than criminal.”535 On
the contrary, “[f]or in respect to the seriousness of the threat to free
expression, the restrictive effect on the communication of ideas, and the
penalty in prospect or actually imposed, civil liability is not less and may
well be more grievous than liability for a fine.”536 After Justice Jackson
recused himself, the Court by equal division affirmed the lower court
ruling in favor of the plaintiff.537 Thus, by 1942, there were four justices 
who likely believed that the First Amendment might influence the
resolution of a public-official libel case. 
Thomas also asserts that the Court did not “meddle” in libel law
between 1791 and 1964. This, too, demonstrates very little. As Lee Levine




533. Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1940).
534. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 316 U.S. 642 (No.
745).
535. Id. (emphasis added).
536. Id.
537. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 316 U.S. at 642; see also Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at 31–32, Phila. Rec. Co. v.
O’Donnell, 51 A.2d 775 (Pa. 1946) (pressing argument that punitive damages in
libel case violated the First Amendment).
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1532021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
and Stephen Wermiel observed, that the Court did not reach the issue until
1964 was neither “surprising, [n]or particularly persuasive.”538 Without
incorporation of the First Amendment against the States until the 1920s, 
there would have been few occasions—save reviewing defamation cases
from Washington, D.C. and federal territories (which, admittedly, did
exist)—where the Court could have addressed the conflict between the
First Amendment and the common law of libel. 
For the same reason, reliance on pre-incorporation sources asserting
that libel judgments do not infringe on freedom of speech is also
unpersuasive. Both Thomas and Gorsuch, for example, rely on Justice
Story, who, in 1825, wrote that “[t]he liberty of speech, or of the press, . . . 
are not endangered by the punishment of libellous publications. The liberty
of speech and the liberty of the press do not authorize malicious and
injurious defamation.”539 But in 1825, this was trite. It was a perfectly 
accurate statement of law, as the First Amendment’s protections for each
were applicable only to the national government. The ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment abrogates Story’s observation.
Thomas is on no more solid footing in citing the Court’s statements in
post-incorporation cases to the effect that state libel law was not limited
by the First Amendment. While Thomas quotes the 1931 case Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson for the dicta that “common law rules that subject
the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private
injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions,”
this statement is not so unequivocal when read in context.540 The Court in
Near quickly qualified its unnecessary dicta: “In the present case, we have
no occasion to inquire as to the permissible scope of subsequent
punishment.”541 
In fact, in Near one can find early indications of a sensitivity to speech
relating to public officials. At issue was the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute that empowered the State to enjoin “a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”542 
In considering an appeal from the publishers of The Saturday Press, the
Court announced, “The limits of this sovereign power must always be
determined with appropriate regard to the particular subject of its
exercise.”543 Recognizing that the liberty of speech and the press was not
538. Levine and Wermiel, supra note20, at 23.
539. Dexter v. Spear, 7 F. Cas. 624 (C.C.R.I. 1825) (No. 3,867).
540. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931)).
541. Near, 283 U.S. at 715.
542. Id. at 701–02.
543. Id. at 707.
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154 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
an “absolute right,” it observed that “the power of the state stops short of
interference with what are deemed to be certain indispensable
requirements of the liberty assured.”544 To determine the nature of the 
liberty assured, it was necessary to understand “the historic conception of
the liberty of the press and whether the statute under review violates the
essential attributes of that liberty.”545 
Notably, the Court took specific aim at the statute being “directed not
simply at the circulation of scandalous and defamatory statements with
regard to private citizens, but at the continued publication by newspapers
and periodical of charges against public officers of corruption,
malfeasance in office, or serious neglect of duty.”546 In doing so, the statute
did not afford to the defendants a number of defenses they would
otherwise have to civil and criminal libel charges concerning public 
officials, including the defense in a prosecution of libel for publication
“honestly made, in belief of its truth, and upon reasonable grounds for such
belief, and consist[ing] of fair comments upon the conduct of a person in
respect to public affairs.”547 This is the same actual-malice-like defense 
recognized generations earlier in cases like Burnham and later in Coleman.
The Court then turned to the question in the case: “[W]hether a statute
authorizing such proceedings in restraint of publication is consistent with
the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed.”548 The Court answered this question not by simply invoking 
Blackstone. Instead, it explained, “The exceptional nature of its limitations 
places in a strong light the general conception that liberty of the press,
historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints . . . .”549 Freedom of press in the United States had “broadened
with the exigencies of the colonial period and with the efforts to secure
freedom from oppressive administration,” like that during the Sedition
Act.550 Quoting Madison, the Court said, “In every State, probably, in the
Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and
measures of public men of every description which has not been confined
to the strict limits of the common law.”551 And while this new liberty came 
with abuse, “it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their
544. Id. at 707–08.
545. Id. at 708.
546. Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
547. Id. at 710 n.3 (quoting MINN. STATS. 1927 §§ 10112, 10113 (1927)).
548. Id. at 713.
549. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
550. Id. at 716–17.
551. Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
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1552021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those
yielding the proper fruits.”552 
Near then, far from undercutting Sullivan, forecasts its result through 
its recognition that restraints on speech relating to public officials are
especially noxious for their anti-democratic effect. In so recognizing, it
thought it important that the statute at issue contained no exception for
statements made with the honest belief that they were true. In other words,
Near assesses the statute not merely as a prior restraint but as an especially
pernicious kind of prior restraint that operated to shield public officials
from public examination and criticism. Near also did not premise its result
on whether the defamatory charges sought to be abated were true or false. 
Rather, the Court concluded, “The fact that the public officers named in
this case, and those associated with the charges of official dereliction, may
be deemed to be impeccable, cannot affect the conclusion that the statute
imposes an unconstitutional restraint upon publication.”553 Near’s logic is
thus strikingly similar to those nineteenth century cases reviewed at length
in Part IV.
There are also reasons to question Thomas’s and Gorsuch’s pragmatic
concerns. Starting with Gorsuch, the very premise of his objection to the
actual-malice rule suffers from internal inconsistencies. On the one hand,
he argued in Berisha that the Court strayed by departing from the original
meaning of the First Amendment at the time of the Founding. On the other
hand, he suggested that ideas about the First Amendment in Sullivan
should be revisited to respond to a changing world. If our understanding
of the First Amendment should be limited by the Founders’ understanding,
then it is unclear why the particularities of our current media climate (or
the import of the changes since Sullivan) should matter in determining the
protection offered, if any, by the First Amendment.
Setting that aside, each of Gorsuch’s arguments against the actual-
malice rule depend on the interaction of three things: (1) how the actual-
malice rule developed after Sullivan, (2) how the economics of news
changed since Sullivan, and (3) how the media ecosystem evolved since
Sullivan. Unlike in 1964, he argued, “today virtually anyone in this
country can publish virtually anything for immediate consumption
552. Id. 
553. Id. at 723. Thomas also invoked the well-known language from Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire about defamation not being a class of speech protected by the
First Amendment. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 681 (2019) (quoting Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)). But this language is obiter
dictum. Chaplinsky had nothing to do with the law of defamation, and this statement
did not answer the question Near expressly left open.
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156 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
virtually anywhere in the world.”554 As a result, the value of news had been 
diluted.555 As traditional publishers failed, they were replaced by less
reputable “24-hour cable news” and websites that “monetize anything that
garners clicks.”556 This incentivized what was left of the reputable
publishers to publish not the truth but what competed with the new
entrants.557 To make matters worse, while Gorsuch argued that the Court
had adopted the actual-malice rule to protect “some false information,” in
the intervening years “the actual malice standard has evolved from a high
bar to recovery into an effective immunity from liability” as evidenced by
the relatively few libel judgments secured by public plaintiffs.558 In short, 
“the distribution of disinformation—which costs almost nothing to 
generate” and risks nothing either—“has become a profitable business
while the economic model that supported reporters, fact-checking, and
editorial oversight has deeply eroded.”559 
If this were all true, Gorsuch would be right that, perhaps, it would be
time to rethink the actual-malice rule. But Gorsuch provided nothing more
than assumptions. First, he assumed that because disinformation exists— 
and certainly it does—that its existence makes others less likely to aim to
tell the truth too. But he provided no evidence for this assertion. And, in
fact, it is contrary to the very purpose of the news: telling truthful stories
about matters of public concern. Second, he assumed that because times 
are tight for many news organizations, they have given up on telling the
truth. But he provided no evidence for this statement either. Third, he
assumed that the lack of libel judgments means that actual malice has
turned into something of an immunity. But he ignored another more
obvious reason for the lack of such judgments: generally, news
organizations are not in the business of publishing known falsehoods.
Once each of these assumptions is knocked down, Gorsuch’s conclusion
that “[i]t seems that publishing without investigation, fact-checking, or
editing has become the optimal legal strategy” or that “ignorance is bliss”
is little more than judicial puffery.560 
Gorsuch and Thomas also lamented that, with the internet, private
citizens could become public figures overnight, making Sullivan
applicable to a much larger group of plaintiffs than was ever possible in




557. Id. at 2428.
558. Id.
559. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
560. Id.
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1572021] IN DEFENSE: NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
1964. As Gorsuch put it, “Individuals can be deemed ‘famous’ because of
their notoriety in certain channels of our now-highly segmented media
even as they remain unknown in most.”561 This is a sleight of hand though. 
Although at times the Court has described public figures as those having
“general fame or notoriety,” it has never required national fame or 
notoriety in order to be considered a public figure; instead, it has required
“general fame or notoriety in the community” or that the plaintiff, while
not of general fame or notoriety in the community, has “voluntarily
inject[ed]” herself into a controversy.562 At any rate, that unfamous people 
might be considered public figures is entirely consistent with the common
law. The teacher offering typing classes in nineteenth century Philadelphia
was not famous; nor was the railroad baron. But both were declared to be
public figures based on their involvement in public affairs. 
Nor does Gorsuch ever explain why news organizations that do try
their best to get it right should forfeit the actual-malice rule simply because
disinformation peddlers exist. In a way, Gorsuch’s argument endorses a
kind of heckler’s veto: because bad actors exist, the law abiders must give
up long-recognized First Amendment protections. This argument also
seems to conflict with Gorsuch’s own general concerns about the current
economy of news. One would think that the media being in such a
precarious spot financially, as Gorsuch repeatedly points out, would be
reason to keep the Sullivan rule, not to throw it out. Sullivan, after all, was
a case about the Times risking bankruptcy.
Certainly, purposeful disinformation is a problem, but the actual-
malice rule does not, as Thomas and Gorsuch appear to believe, “insulate
those who perpetrate lies from traditional remedies like libel suits.”563 
Sullivan does not protect lies; it protects, as the common-law rule before
it, falsehoods published under the honest belief at the time of publication 
that they were true. In recent libel lawsuits filed against a raft of
conservative talking heads over bunk claims about election interference
and, specifically, Dominion Voting Systems’ role in it, commentators
recognized that “there is pretty good evidence that will allow a jury to find
actual malice by those defendants.”564 Thus, defamation liability remains
a powerful weapon against lies.
561. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
562. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351–52 (1974) (emphasis
added).
563. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
564. Tucker Higgins, Dominion and Smartmatic have serious shot at victory
in election disinformation suits, experts say, CNBC (Feb. 24, 2021), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/02/24/dominion-smartmatic-defamation-cases-credible-ex
perts.html [https://perma.cc/EQL9-BE5Q].
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158 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Finally, Thomas said that “it is unclear why exposing oneself to an
increased risk of becoming a victim [of libel] necessarily means forfeiting
the remedies legislatures put in place for such victims.”565 But this is
sophistry. As we have seen, for more than 200 years courts have accepted 
that, for public officials and public figures, increased criticism is the cost
of doing business. It is eminently sensible to demand from the person who
seeks public admiration that they accept the risk of public condemnation.
Otherwise, the law becomes nothing more than a subsidy for the rich,
powerful, and famous, insulating them from any and all criticism however
harsh while they run roughshod over broader public interests.
CONCLUSION
Sullivan is under attack—both as a matter of history and for pragmatic
concerns. But neither attack supports discarding Sullivan. Fundamentally,
the originalist argument should be rejected because it is decidedly 
ahistorical and un-American. No small part of the Revolution stemmed
from attacks on the freedom of the press in the Colonies. The government
adopted thereafter—one where the governed were at once the governors— 
required a system for the exchange of ideas that protected the People in 
their criticism of their agents in government. This would come to include 
those, who while not themselves public officials, wielded power over the
resolution of questions of public importance. The history of libel in this
country is really a history of republican thought.
To posit then, that today we should think about freedom of the press
in the same way that the English thought about it before the Revolution, 
that we should equate the freedom of the press under the First Amendment
to the freedom of the press at common law, is to cede back basic ideals
over which the Founding generation went to war. It ignores the teachings
of James Wilson and Thomas Jefferson, as well as St. George Tucker who
argued in 1803 that freedom of the press, as compared to England, stood
on “very different . . . footing . . . in the United States, where it is made a
fundamental article of the constitutions.”566 As the Delaware high court
wrote in Rice v. Simmons in rejecting overwrought reliance on the
common law of England in 1838:
[N]o one can investigate the law of libel without feeling an
invincible repugnance to admit in their full extent some of the old
cases. . . . It cannot be that we are bound to run into the same
absurdities [as in England]; that, at this day, and in this country,
565. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2425.
566. 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at app. at 19.
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the opinions of black letter judges, however learned; the
judgments of star chamber courts, so often subservient to state
purposes; and the whole law of slander, scandalum magnatum and
all, must, in the absence of legal enactments, be regarded by our
courts as the law of this state; without considering the great
advances that civil liberty has made throughout the world, and that
the liberty of speech and of the press is now a very different thing
from what it was in the ages from which these precedents are
drawn.567 
Nor is there reason to believe that removing the protections of the
actual-malice rule will confront the serious problems that do face the news
industry or our broader mass-communication ecosystem. If anything,
overturning Sullivan would seem likely to worsen matters, to chill
reputable news organizations while doing little to deter bad actors
operating anonymously on the internet. These bad actors are often difficult
to find—as many operate outside the United States. And one can question
whether it would make practical sense for plaintiffs to spend substantial
sums litigating claims over those they can find only to end up with a
judgment against an extraterritorial, likely judgment-proof bad actor.
Sullivan does not need to be overturned. It serves, for news
organizations and private citizens alike, exactly the functions it was meant
to in 1964. If Thomas and Gorsuch really are concerned with
disinformation peddlers and are looking for solutions, rather than overrule
Sullivan perhaps it is time to breathe life into the Press Clause whereby the
actual-malice rule would apply only to defendants that are bona fide news
organizations and journalists—micro-local, local, and national. Sure, this
would involve the Court in the problem of deciding who is the press and
who is not, but such an approach would be more tailored to the ill that it is
supposedly trying to address. While Gorsuch argues that “‘[t]he liberty of
the press’ has never been ‘confined to newspapers and periodicals’; it has 
always ‘comprehend[ed] every sort of publication which affords a vehicle
of information and opinion,’” this has never strictly been true—at least not
in the libel context.568 In both Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Philadelphia 
Newspapers v. Hepps, the Court spoke in terms of rules required when
media defendants were defendants in a case.569 The same can be done for
the actual-malice rule across the board, thereby protecting bona fide news
567. Rice v. Simmons, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 417, 428–429 (1838).
568. Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2424 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
569. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
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organizations and journalists and leaving disinformation peddlers open to
liability.
There are serious issues facing how we communicate today. The
marketplace of ideas has been corrupted using the same technological
advances in communication that Gorsuch laments. More fundamentally,
there is reason to question whether the marketplace-of-ideas theory ever
provided an accurate portrayal of how truth and falsity interact. It turns out
that the marketplace of ideas, like any marketplace, is susceptible to
monopolies and counterfeits and is filled with bad actors and shady
enterprises acting with ulterior motives. When the marketplace is awash
in lies and flooded with knowing falsehoods, it seems like the last thing
one should do is to rip away protections for the honest brokers, those who
are only trying to speak the truth the best they can with the information
they have been able to gather. 
